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PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Police Association of The City of
New Rochelle

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #A-76-235

and
The City of New Rochelle
(Police Department)

In accordance with Article XI of the collective

bargaining

agreement dated July 1, 1974 between the City of New Rochelle,
hereinafter referred to as the "City" and Police Association of
New Rochelle, N.Y., Inc., hereinafter referred to as the
"Association", the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator
to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Does General Order No. 19 dated September
27, 1976 violate the contract between the
parties? If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at Police Headquarters, New Rochelle,
New York on May 4, 1977 at which time representatives of the City
and the Association appeared and were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

General Order No. 19 reads:
A Patrol Team will consist of one (1)
Lieutenant, two (2) Sargeants and about
sixteen (16) Police Officers. A Patrol
Team will be assigned daily to each tour,
i.e., 8:00 am - 4:00 pm, 4:00 pm - 12:00 am,
12:00 am - 8:00 am.
Rotation of tours for Patrol Teams shall continue according to past departmental practices;

-2existing General Orders and Rules regarding
employee vacation selection will remain unchanged.
Combined with the NEIGHBORHOOD PATROL TEAM
PROJECT, all employees assigned to the Patrol
Unit will participate in a MANDATORY TRAINING
PROGRAM.
The Training Program is designed to prepare
employees to assume additional and more specialized duties that directly relate to "police
work."
The content of the Program will include, for
example, classroom and field training about
preliminary criminal investigation procedures,
advanced patrol methods, penal and procedural
law, interpersonals relationships, computer
operations, etc.
There will be five (5) training cycles during
a period of about fifty (50) weeks. Each Patrol
Team will be assigned to a training cycle for
ten (10) weeks. Training classes will be provided
during one (1) day of each duty week; a Patrol
Team will receive, therefore, ten (10) duty tours
or eighty (80) hours of training. After a Patrol
Team completes their training, another Patrol
Team shall begin their training program or cycle.
All training classes will begin at 8:00 am and
terminate at 4:00 pm; employees will strictly
comply with Department Rules, Regulations and
Orders during the training program.
All Patrol Unit supervisors, i.e., Lieutenants
and Sargeants, will attend a meeting with the
Police Commissioner and staff on Thursday,
October 7, 1976 at 1:00 pm in the Training Room.
The general purpose of this meeting is to provide
further information about the NEIGHBORHOOD PATROL
TEAM AND MANDATORY TRAINING PROJECTS.
All Patrol Team assignments will be completed
during the week of October 4, 1976, and employees
shall be notified by departmental order.

-3Article IV (Work Week) of the collective bargaining agreement reads:
1. Work Week and Tours of Duty. All employees
in the bargaining unit shall be required to work
an average of 35.5 hours per week. There shall
be in effect a 4/72 duty chart, which shall be
applicable to all employees in the bargaining
unit whose duty requires them to work rotating
tours of duty. For all other employees in the
bargaining unit a work schedule shall be designed
to ensure that the work week averages 35.5 hours.
The regular schedule provided herein shall be
understood to mean actual working hours.
The Association contends that the training referred to
in General Order No. 19 and which uniformly begins at 8:00 am
and terminates at 4:00 pm violates Article IV of the contract
at those times that the scheduled classes fall outside of an
employee's regularly scheduled tour,in that required attendance
at those times impermissably varies the 4/72 duty chart.
The City argues in the alternative.

First, it asserts

that if the training classes require a variation in the "pure
4/72 schedule" it occurs only five times in fifty weeks and
when it shortens the amount of time off in any instance, that
time is made up by an equal amount of additional time off
added to a subsequent swing period.

Hence the City concludes,

the variation is inconsequential and substantial compliance
with the 4/72 duty chart remains.

Second and alternatively the

City contends that the 4/72 duty chart is inapplicable when an
employee is assigned to the training classes because during
that day of training he is removed from and not "required to

-4work rotating tours of duty."
Though I fully recognize the importance of the training
program, I cannot find contractual support for either of the
City's positions.
The language of Article IV is mandatory.

In pertinent

part it states:
There shall be in effect a 4/72 duty chart,
which shall be applicable to all employees
in the bargaining unit whose duty requires
them to work rotating tours of duty.
(Emphasis added).
As I see it this language is unconditional and permits no
variations in or from the 4/72 duty chart.

The chart represents

a delicate balance between the need to maintain police service on
a daily round-the-clock basis and reasonable time off for the
family and personal lives of police officers.

Though the City

may believe that a shorter amount of time off on one swing is
adequately taken care of by a greater amount of time off in a
subsequent swing period, it must be noted that the precise periods
of time were agreed to and legislated to take care of that delicate balance and any change disturbs the intent and effect of
that balance.

Hence the mandatory language using the mandatory

word "shall" two times in the same sentence.

That means that

for bargaining unit employees who work rotating tours of duty
there may be no variation from the strict 4/72 duty chart unless
such variations are mutually agreed to or otherwise negotiated
or legislated.

The City's variations, no matter how infrequent
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they may be, are not permitted under the strict and unconditional
language referred to above.

Accordingly the City's first

argument must be rejected.
As to its second argument I am simply not persuaded that
scheduled classes between 8:00 am and 4:00 pm which once every
sixteen weeks falls outside an employee's regularly scheduled
tour (and hence during his otherwise scheduled time off) constitutes the removal of the affected employees from rotating
tours of duty.

The City likens the situation to the training

period which newly hired employees undertake at the beginning
of their employment.
The analogy is inapposite.

In the latter case the training

was on consecutive days for an extended or continuous period of
time.

In the example cited by the City the affected employees

have adequate opportunity to adjust their own schedules and
their family and personal needs to a tour of duty that does not
require the rotation of shifts for the continuous period of that
training.

But in the instant case the employees have no realis-

tic opportunity to make that adjustment.

For one day they are

shifted from their regular tours and required to undertake training between 8:00 am and 4:00

pm.

Thereafter the training schedule

is not maintained on a consecutive or continuous basis but rather
significantly, the employee immediately returns to his rotating
tours for another fifteen or sixteen weeks.

For all intents

and purposes therefore with the exception of a single day each

-6sixteen weeks which falls during his time off, he maintains a
duty schedule or rotating tours of duty.

I would consider it

a tortured interpretation if that single day was deemed the
removal of the employee from "duty requir(ing) (him) to work
rotating tours of duty."

On the contrary I think that the in-

applicability of the 4/72 duty chart to employees who are not
required to work rotating tours of duty relates to those with
regular, fixed and continuous tours of duty of the same fixed
hours each day for extended periods of time.

One day a week

each sixteen weeks, over a fifty week period, is simply too
sporatic and non-continuous

to meet that test or to contract-

ually change those employees from rotating tours of duty.
Therefore I must reject the City's second argument.
For the foregoing reasons General Order No. 19 as presently
administered violates Article IV of the collective bargaining
agreement.
As I believe the parties know, New Rochelle is this
Arbitrator's "home town."

I am most anxious to see that its

police force remains effective and well trained.

I agree with

the Police Commissioner that this training program is most
important to that objective and I appreciate the fact that the
volunteer instructors cannot be asked to make themselves available
other than during normal working hours.
the training program discontinued.

I would not want to see

However, when there is a

contract violation the Arbitrator is obligated to so hold and

-7to fashion a remedy.

The remedy I consider to be most

appropriate is that the City cease and desist from scheduling
the training classes in a manner which varies the 4/72 duty
chart.

I would strongly urge the City and the Association to

enter into immediate negotiations on this issue and make a
determined and good faith effort to work out an arrangement
which will permit the training program to go forward.

That

arrangement, might very well be a continuation of the present
schedule, which, because of mutual agreement thereto, and not
unilateral promulgation by the Department, may no longer be
objectionable to the Association.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
General Order No. 19 as presently
administered violates Article IV of
the collective bargaining agreement.
Absent mutual agreement of the parties
on the retention of the present schedule
of training classes or some other mutually
agreed upon arrangement, the City is directed
to cease and desist from implementing General
Order No. 19 in a manner which varies the
4/72 duty chart.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

-8DATED: June 14, 1977
STATE OF New York ) ss> .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this fourteenth day of June, 1977 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, CITY OF NEW YORK
and
UNIFORMED FIRE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Uniformed Fire Officers Association
Local 854, I.A.F.F., AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #A-610-76

and
City of New York (Fire

Department)

The stipulated issue is:
Has the Fire Department violated Article
VI of the collective bargaining agreement
in utilizing Captains and Battalion Chief
Officers in the ranks of Battalion Chief
and Deputy Chief, respectively? If so what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on October 18, 1976 at which time representatives of the parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties

filed post-hearing briefs and other statements.
This case involves the application and interpretation of
Article VI Section 1 of the collective bargaining agreement.

As

I reminded the parties at the hearing, in my capacity as
Impartial Chairman and mediator I was an intimate participant
in the negotiation of Article VI Section 1.

My notes and re-

collection reveal that I participated in the drafting of the
contract language of that Article and Section.

I am satisfied

I know its meaning and intent.
The City's interpretation is correct.

Article VI Section 1

-2-

does not bar the City from using Captains to cover vacancies
in the Battalion Chief classification nor does it bar the
Department from using Battalion Chiefs to cover vacancies in
the Deputy Chief classification, provided the Department pays
the officer assigned to the duties of the higher rank the prescribed rate of pay of the higher rank if he has not been replaced in that assignment by an officer of the rank of the
vacancy within the first two hours of the assignment.

In other

words Article VI Section 1 relates to pay for out of title assign
ments.

It accords the Department two hours to obtain an officer

equivalent to the rank of the vacancy without incurring liability
to pay the contractually

prescribed higher rate to the officer

of the lower rank assigned to that vacancy.

But if the Depart-

ment fails to make the appropriate replacement before the expira
tion of two hours, it is then obligated to pay the assignee at
the prescribed rate of the higher rank for the entire tour,
whether or not he completes the entire tour in that assignment.
If as the Union asserts, the Department is obligated to obtain
a qualified replacement, that pay requirement obviously would
be unnecessary and meaningless.

With those conditions, the

Department may make the out of title assignments which the Union
complains about in this proceeding.
If because of the fiscal crisis or otherwise, the City has
been exercising this right more extensively than was anticipated
when this particular contract section was negotiated, that is a

-3-

ci.rcumstan.ee which cannot be cured by arbitration, but rather
f

is a subject for collective bargaining between the parties.
If the foregoing interpretation and application of Article
VI Section 1 is violative of any law or statute, that is a
matter to be dealt with in another forum, and the rights of the
parties in that regard are expressly reserved.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes the
following AWARD:
The Fire Department has not violated
Article VI of the collective bargaining agreement by utilizing Captains
and Battalion Chiefs in the ranks of
Battalion Chief and Deputy Chief
respectively.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: January 3, 1977
STATE OF New York ) ss> .
COUNTY OF New York ) "
On this third day of January, 1977 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Civil Service Employees Association

CONSENT AWARD
Case #1367-0362-76

and
State of New York

The stipulated issue was:
Is the grievant DeWitt Bruin guilty of
the charge set forth in the letter of
November 3, 1976? If so, is the State's
proposed penalty of discharge proper?
If not, what shall the remedy be, if any?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on January 3, 1977 at which time Mr. Bruin and
representatives of the above named parties appeared.
During the course of the hearing, with the assistance of
the Arbitrator, the parties reached a settlement of the dispute,
Mr. Bruin expressly accepted said settlement.
At the request of the parties I make the terms of their
settlement, my AWARD, as follows:
1. Mr. Bruin is guilty of an offense for
which a disciplinary penalty is proper.
2. Mr. Bruin has been suspended since
November 1, 1976. He shall be reinstated
without back pay and the period from his
suspension to his restoration to work shall
be deemed the disciplinary penalty for the
offense committed.
3. The Arbitrator retains jurisdiction over
this matter for six (6) months from the date

-2-

hereof. If during that period the
State claims that Mr. Bruin has
committed any offenses warranting
discipline or dismissal, those
charges and proposed penalties of
the State shall be submitted forthwith to this Arbitrator for review and
decision.

Er/c J. Schmertz f\r

DATED: January 5, 1977
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York ) " '
On this fifth day of January, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Professional Staff Association

FINDINGS, OPINION AND
AWARD
Case #1330 0403 75

and
New York State United Teachers, Inc.

APPEARANCES
NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS, INC.
Bernard F. Ashe, General Counsel
Gerard John DeWolf, of Counsel
PROFESSIONAL STAFF ASSOCIATION
Pozefsky, Tocci & Pozefsky, Esqs.
Harry Pozefsky, of Counsel
Pursuant to Article III Paragraph E Step III of the
collective bargaining agreement between the Professional Staff
Association, hereinafter referred to as "PSA" or the "Union",
and the New York State United Teachers, Inc., hereinafter referred
to as "NYSUT" or the "Employer", the Undersigned was designated
as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated
issue:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Mr. William W. Fineman? If not what shall
be the remedy?
Hearings were held on September 29, 1975, March 24, March
25, April 15, May 17, May 18, May 31 and September 12, 1976 at
which time Mr. Fineman hereinafter referred to as "Fineman" or
the "grievant", and representatives of the PSA and NYSUT appeared

-2All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

PSA and

NYSUT filed post-hearing briefs.
NYSUT discharged field representative Fineman on February
14, 1975.

The letter of dismissal (Employer Exhibit #5) charged

that he had (1) made a false report concerning his whereabouts
and activity for February 7, 1975; (2) that he had improperly
submitted a luncheon expense voucher for the period including
February 7, 1975; (3) that he had improperly used NYSUT credit
cards; (4) that he had followed improper procedures regarding
improper practice charges; and (5) that he had used poor

judge-

ment in the St. Johnsville crisis.
Subsequently the Employer alleged other offenses

concerning

"improper vouchers and office calendar entries", "time allowances'
and the use of the "prescription drug card".

These latter charges

will be dealt with later herein.
In capsulated form, the evidence presented respectively by
NYSUT and PSA with respect to each enumerated item, and my finding thereon are as follows:
The "False Report"
1.

Constance Gallup, administrative assistant for NYSUT's

Regional Field Services Division, testified that she had seen
Mr. Fineman on Friday morning, February 7, 1975, at the Albany
Airport at about twenty of ten (1,31).

She informed her super-

visor, Mr. Daniel McK.illip, about this observation (I, 30, 32)
Numbers in
numbers in
references
began with

parenthesis, unless otherwise indicated refer to page
the stenographic record. Roman numeral I precedes
to Volume I of the record since consecutive pagination
the second volume.

In
-3and thereafter contacted Mrs. Jacqueline Swatt to inquire whether
Fineman had met or talked with her; whether a meeting had been
scheduled; and whether a meeting had been cancelled (1,30,33).
Mrs. Gallup stated that Mrs. Swatt answered "no" to all these
inquiries (1,30).
2. Daniel McKillip, Assistant Director for Field Services,
noted that he had unsuccessfully attempted to locate Fineman on
Friday, February 7, 1975 to discuss a phone call he had received
the prior evening from Howard Wells, a member of the Tri-County
BOCES negotiating teach ( 1,100-107,116-118).

Mr. McKillip in-

formed Fineman's immediate superior, Mr. Ratte about this situation and asked Mr. Ratte to investigate (I, 120-121,127-129).
3. Raymond G. Ratte, Coordinator of the Albany Service
Center, testified that Fineman stated on February 11, 1975 that he
had a meeting with Mrs. Swatt on the morning of February 7, 1975
(1,145); that he left the office early that morning to meet Mrs.
Swatt; and thereafter returned from the meeting to catch an
11:30 A.M. flight at the Albany Airport (1,145-146).

Mr. Ratte

also testified that Fineman gave a different explanation the
following day, February 12th, 1975 when informed (a) that Mrs.
Swatt had failed to confirm that she had a meeting or had
scheduled a meeting with him; (b) that Mrs. Gallup had seen him
at the Albany Airport near 10:00 A.M.; and (c) that his secretary
had indicated that he had left the office around 10:00 A.M. to
go to the Tri-County BOCES (I, 154-156, 1,147 and 127,128 of

-4Volume II).

Fineman then stated that he was in the office very

early and left approximately 9:10 A.M. to go to BOCES via a short
cut to see Mrs. Swatt.

There he learned that Mrs. Swatt would

not be available until 11:30 A.M. and he consequently returned
to the Albany Airport to catch his 10:57 A.M. flight (1,156).
4. Janice Rizzo, FinemanTs secretary, agreed that he
arrived in the office around 9:00 A.M. (1314-1315) and that he
had advised her he was going to BOCES when he left (1316).
1. Fineman testified in his defense that he arrived at the
Albany Service Center early on February 7th, 1975, somewhere
between 7:30 A.M. and 9:00 A.M. (229,679) and began working on
an improper practice presentation for the Johnstown Teachers
Association

(680).

He claimed he received a call from Mrs. Swatt

shortly after 9:00 A.M. which obviated their 11 o'clock meeting
(229-230) and he denied that he ever told Mr. Ratte that he had
a meeting with Mrs. Swatt (691).
2. Jacqueline Swatt, former president of the Tri-County
BOCES Teachers Association asserted that she had telephoned
Fineman on February 7th, 1975 and that their conversation convinced
her to file a much discussed improper practice charge (878-880).
She also noted that Mr. Ratte and/or a secretary had contacted
her inquiring only whether she had met Fineman and she responded
"no."

She added that no one inquired whether Fineman had ful-

filled his assignment

(886-890).

-53. Richard W. Horowitz, a PSA representative, stated in
connection with the February 7, matter that Fineman had told
Mr. Ratte prior to his discharge that he fulfilled his obligation
to the BOCES Local (1208).

i

FINDING
I accept the testimony and evidence adduced by NYSUT as
credible and accurate.
of after thought.

I reject the grievant's defense as borne

Neither Fineman nor his bargaining represent-

ative ever advised Mr. Ratte or NYSUT on February llth or 12th,
1975 that Mrs. Swatt's alleged telephone conversation on
February 7th, 1975 had precluded the alleged meeting (1113-1114,
1119-1120,1210,1211,1382).

Instead, the grievant waited nearly

a month after his discharge to first raise this defense at the
step two grievance hearing before Mr. DeLeonardis (Employer
Exhibit #12).

It is doubtful that Fineman intended to meet

Mrs. Swatt at the BOCES local on February 7th, 1975 since (a)
she testified that she had no meeting scheduled with Mr. Fineman
for that morning (889); he had not informed her about that
meeting (906); and (b) he conceded that he never advised her
about a meeting for February 7th, 1975 (684-685).

Fineman also

admitted that he brought his luggage to the office on February
7th, 1975 for an 11:00 A.M. flight-the same time as the purportedly
scheduled meeting with Mrs. Swatt (682-684).

I also cannot

accept Mrs. Swatt's testimony that she telephoned Fineman on
February 7th, 1975 since, even assuming Mrs. Rizzo missed that

-6incoming call (1315,1325-1327), it seems highly unlikely that
Mrs. Swatt would not have made some reference to that conversation upon questioning by Mrs. Gallup and Mr. Ratte when they
asked her on two separate occasions about Fineman's whereabouts.
I further doubt that Mrs. Swatt's call, assuming such
call occurred, unexpectedly altered Fineman's plans, since Mrs.
Swatt never asserted during her direct or cross

examination

that Fineman intended to see her on February 7th, 1975 (865-915)
Indeed, Fineman

had just met with Mrs. Swatt and her local a

day or two earlier (873,877,879,902-902 and Employer Exhibit 3h)
In other words, even if Mrs. Swatt spoke with Fineman on
February 7th, 1975, I must conclude that he already had preconceived plans to take a flight from the Albany Airport.
The Luncheon Expense Voucher
1. Raymond G. Ratte, testified that he questioned Fineman
on February llth, 1975 about the luncheon voucher of $4.25 for
February 7th, 1975 (Employer Exhibit 3h) and Fineman contended
that he should receive reimbursement since he had an 11:30 A.M.
flight and he believed he could take lunch anywhere between
11:30 A.M. and 2:00 P.M. (1,148-149).
based apparently on his

Mr. Ratte disagreed,

conclusion that Fineman was engaged in

personal business and particularly as the luncheon expense had
not been actually incurred.

Fineman then removed the charge

from his voucher (1,149).
1. Fineman testified that he completed this voucher in

-7advance of the actual expenditure, pursuant to a custom he had
developed (228-229,693-694,702-711).

He then left the voucher

unchanged after his alleged conversation with Mrs. Swatt

(229)

and cites "carelessness" to explain why he did not strike the
$4.25 when he signed the voucher on February 11, 1975 (697).
FINDING
Mr. Fineman has admitted that he
voucher.

erred in submitting this

The only real question therefore is whether he

intentionally

submitted the voucher to receive "reimbursement"

for a non-existing
inconsistant.

expense.

Fineman1s position is prejudicially

He cannot use carelessness as a defense in view

of his acknowledgement that he told Mr. Ratte he felt lunch
time could be taken anywhere between 11:30 A.M. and 2:00 P.M.
(696).

That statement indicates to me that Fineman knowingly

sought the reimbursement.
Use Of NYSUT Credit Cards
1. Robert I. Allen, Assistant Director for Administration
for Regional Field Services, testified that in early 1974 (I,
35-38 and 1341 of the last volume) he had located two trips
between Albany and Buffalo (Employer's Exhibits 4b and 4c)
which were charged on the Air Travel Card issued to Fineman and
not listed on Fineman's vouchers.

Mr. Allen confronted Fineman

with this fact on either March 3rd, 4th, or 5th, 1974 (I, 80-81)
and Fineman subsequently paid for the cost of these two flights
by personal check dated March 6, 1974 (436,639).

Mr. Allen

-8told Fineman to use the Air Travel Card for personal reasons
only in an emergency situation and to indicate such use on the
voucher (1,42-43,93-94).
Mr. Allen discovered two more tickets to Buffalo about
a month later and again spoke to Fineman who explained he had
incurred those travel expenses for the B'Nai B'rith Organization (1,47).
2. Raymond G. Ratte, testified that he, too, spoke to
Fineman during 1974 and advised him that he could only use the
Air Travel Card for business reasons except in emergencies and
then he had to report it on the voucher

(29-30).

1. Fineman, acknowledged his awareness to report the use
of the Air Travel Card (417-422,423,424) but that Mr. Ratte
"badgered" him about the use and reporting of the Air Travel
Card (449-450,459,460,461-462,463,1134-1135).

Fineman main-

tained that he had advised Mr. Allen about an expected reimbursement for the cost of those trips from the B'Nai B'rith
(434).

Fineman further claimed that he had advised Mr. Allen

that he had incurred charges on the Air Travel Card for
personal use and he requested Mr. Allen to let him know when
the billing came through (438).
FINDING
Fineman conceded that he had used the Air Travel Card fot
personal reasons and had not followed designated procedure in
reporting it (1365-1367).

However, it is undisputed that he

-9eventually paid all charges for the use of the card.

His

testimony that other professional representatives had also
used the travel card for personal use and similarly settled
their accounts (1349-1350) is unrefuted.

The key issue, in

my view, is whether he alerted Mr. Ratte and Mr. Allen to his
personal use of the card, and whether he attempted or hoped to
avoid payment for these trips.
The weight of evidence compels a finding that Fineman
failed to alert Mr. Ratte or Mr. Allen about his use of the
card for personal business.

He failed to alert Mr. Allen on

March 6, 1974, when he issued a check for prior personal
flights that he had just used the Air Travel Card again for
personal business on March 3, 1974 (1,81-82, and 1340 of the
last volume).

Likewise, Fineman's multiple and conflicting

explanations for the various trips to the Buffalo area

(440-

447,573,577,632-636,642,757) casts serious doubts on the truth
of his assertion that he informed Mr. Allen of the unexpected
reimbursement from B'nai B'rith and undermines belief in his
testimony that he generally alerted Mr. Allen to his personal
trips.

His repeated use of the card for personal reasons

throughout

1974 despite warnings and his acknowledged

failure to report such personal use on vouchers, lend credence
to Messrs. Ratte's and Allen's statements that Fineman never
called his personal use of the Air Travel Card to their
attention (1,78-79; Volume 11,30-31, last Volume, 1351).

-10By consequence I must find that Fineman expected to
reimburse NYSUT for those personal trips only if or when his
personal use of the Air Travel Card was discovered.
The NYSUT Telephone Credit Card
The threshold question is whether the arbitrator can
consider charges of misuse by Fineman of the NYSUT telephone
credit card, inasmuch as these charges and the evidence in
their support developed from the Employer's post-discharge
investigation.

Counsel for PSA argues that Employer Exhibit

#5 limits NYSUT's case to the reasons set forth therein and
that additional charges not made at the time of dismissal are
barred from this arbitration.
My ruling is that NYSUT can offer evidence in support
of the charges leveled against Fineman at the time of his
discharge even if that evidence was uncovered in a subsequent
investigation; but NYSUT cannot enlarge or change the reasons
for the discharge, by advancing new charges and after acquired
evidence in support of those new charges that were not known
to it when the discharge took place and/or not included in the
dismissal notice.
That ruling allows consideration of Fineman's use of the
NYSUT telephone credit card, since Employer Exhibit #5 refers
to improper use of NYSUT credit cards_ and not just the Air
Travel Card.

Mr. Ratte in fact had begun an investigation

regarding grievant's credit card billings on February 13, 1975

-li-

the day before the discharge (1,160) and had questioned Fineman
about the telephone billings at the time of the discharge (1137138,160-162).

PSA representative Richard Horowitz also verified

that telephone credit charges were discussed during the discharge
meeting (1192,1215-1216).

Mr. Ratte further specifically cited

the misuse of the NYSUT telephone credit card in denying Fineman's
Step 1 grievance

(Employer's Exhibit

#7).

Regarding the actual calls themselves:
1. Raymond G. Ratte testified that he never authorized
placing the calls which Employer Exhibit #11 puts in question (I,
198 and Volume 11,23); rather he told Fineman to refer locals in
the western part of the state to the Jamestown Service Center
(1382-1385).
2. Thomas Hobart, president of NYSUT, added that he, too,
never authorized Fineman to place calls to the western part of the
State (144-145).
1. Fineman conceded that no one authorized or knew about the
telephone credit card calls now in question (527,528) which amount
to approximately $400 (1056).

He acknowledged

that he made many

of these calls to Sally Stouffer, a journalism teacher and business
acquaintance in Jamestown (581-588,668-669) for a variety of
purpose such as receiving information from her about Teachers for
Democracy, an alleged "opposition" caucus within NYSUT (245,247).
Fineman noted that he mainly responded to Mrs. Stouffer's calls
and estimated that these responding calls equalled about $300 (247-

-12248).

However, he also admitted placing various personal telephone

calls while handling business (573,579,580,586-589,595-596,657-659
662-668, Employer Exhibit #24,754-756).
2. Sally Stouffer, confirmed that she had initiated many
calls to Fineman and stated that these calls concerned topics like
public relations work (362-363), a cable TV series (364),
grievances (366)

and the Teachers for Democracy group (371,395).

3. Richard Horowitz, explained that he periodically received
telephone billings and would either subtract personal calls from
his voucher or directly reimburse NYSUT (1174-1175).
FINDINGS
One aspect of the telephone credit card controversy involves
whether Fineman placed business or personal calls to Ms. Stouffer
in Jamestown and elsewhere.

NYSUT has not fully established that

no arguable business function prompted Fineman's calls.
and Ms. Stouffer's testimony indicate

Fineman"s

some business bona fides

for those calls, albeit tenuous.
However, Fineman does admit making certain purely personal
calls, so the unresolved issue is whether he had an affirmative
duty to reimburse NYSUT for those expenses.
argued that he had no such duty.

It can hardly be

He stated that he made reim-

bursement when someone brought a personal charge to his attention
(564-566,570,571).
duty.

I do not consider that sufficient to meet his

In my view, his prior experience in the Utica office, and

general ethical practices should have prompted him to pay those

-13personal charges on his own initiative without the need to be
prodded.

Again I must conclude that he expected or hoped to

avoid paying those charges, unless requested to do so, treating
them as a kind of "fringe benefit" attendant to his job.
The NEA Denver Voucher
This charge also was not specifically mentioned in the
grievant's discharge notice (Employer Exhibit #5), but it relates
to NYSUT's Air Travel Card, and pursuant to my ruling, the
Employer may assert it in this proceeding, as encompassed in the
discharge notice.
1. Robert I. Allen explained that he noticed that Fineman
had purchased two tickets in January 1974 to attend an NEA Denver
Conference

(1,51; Employer's Exhibits #13 and #14) and thereafter

utilized one while submitting the other for full credit (1,52-53).
Mr. Allen explained that he thereafter noted an additional $25
credit for one of the charged tickets (1,51-53,58,70-71) which
Fineman explained to him was due to a change in the class of the
ticket or because of routing difficulties (1,53,71; and 1334-1335
of last volume).

However, Mr. Allen discovered that NEA never

received this $25 credit, and by consequence Fineman received
$25 more than was needed to reimburse NYSUT (1,54-58; Employer
Exhibit #16).
1. Fineman testified that he remitted $25 to the NEA in June,
1974 and gave several different reasons for initially purchasing
two tickets and for the $25 credit: (a) he first thought that he
had transferred from first class to coach, (297); (b) he then

-14thought that he returned from Denver on coach (473); (c) he next
thought that he returned from Chicago to Albany on coach (491);
and (d) he eventually agreed that he rerouted the trip through
Buffalo (491-492 v.543-546).

Fineman also explained that he had

mislaid the first the first ticket, which caused him to purchase
the second (613-617).
FINDINGS
The issue obviously is whether he intended to benefit at
NEA's expense.

The evidence supports that conclusion.

Fineman

admitted that he had not told Mr. Allen about the additional $25
he received from NEA (487-488).

Again Fineman only corrected the

situation after someone else raised the issue and not until more
than six months had passed.
Procedures Regarding The Filing of Improper Practice Charges
1. Daniel C. McKillip explained that a representative
normally discusses unfair labor or practice charges with a
coordinator, then drafts the charge, and finally seeks approval
from the coordinator.
1. Fineman testified that he used to file improper practice
charges on his own because he felt knowledgeable but he then
learned that Mr. Ratte wanted them screened first and he complied
(303-304).

He thereafter never filed any improper practice charge

without prior sanction or approval (303,1066).
2. Richard Horowitz acknowledged that Mr. McKillip had
issued a directive requiring clearance

of improper practice

-15charges by the office coordinator (118-1181 and that Mr. Ratte
had also issued a reminder about clearing improper practice
charges (1267).
FINDING
NYSUT did not demonstrate that the grievant had failed to
clear improper practice charges before filing then.

Mr. McKillip

in fact testified that he assisted Fineman in preparing improper
practice charges and then usually approved them (1,122,123,124).
This charge against the grievant apparently stemmed from Mr. Ratte's
irritation about a prospective improper practice charge against
Tri-County BOCES.

He had just heard about the charge in the

Schenectady Gazette and chastised Fineman for not having previous
notified him.

However Fineman explained that he had merely

threatened such action and had not actually

filed a charge.

He

further explained that this threat had occurred during a bargaining session which had lasted until about 3:00 A.M.

This charge

against grievant cannot stand under these circumstances.
"Poor Judgement In The St. Johnsville Crisis"
Fineman testified that Mr. Ratte had expressed concern over
the handling of the St. Johnsville's crisis.

Mr. Ratte wanted

an explanation why Fineman did not intend to go to St. Johnsville
when a strike vote appeared imminent (1074).

Fineman explained

that he had already spoken with the leader of the St. Johnsville
local and had decided to go to the Fort Plain local since he
believed the latter had a more pressing need for his services
(1074).

-y

-16John Burkhart, a teacher and chairman of the St. Johnsville
local, testified that Fineman ultimately did attend the strike
vote session (964).
FINDING
NYSUT has failed to prove the grievant's alleged bad
judgement in the St. Johnsville crisis.

According to Mr. Burkhart,

Fineman did attend the strike vote meeting, and it had been the
anticipated failure to attend which apparently had precipitated
the charge.

The grievant also had attended an earlier meeting

that week in St. Johnsville with Mr. Ratte which lasted until
about 3:00 A.M.

Mr. Ratte had not mentioned any matter of bad

judgement to Fineman during that protracted meeting (1073-1074);
rather, it appears that the grievant acquitted himself properly
in handling the St. Johnsville situation.
"Improper Vouchers and Office Calendar Entries; Improper Use Of
Release Time (Time Allowances) and Misuse of Prescription Drug
Card".
These charges which allege inter alia that Fineman either
did not perform his assignments, engaged in personal business
during working hours, vouchered non-business expenses for
business reimbursement, misused his prescription drug card;
and took or used unauthorized release time were not set forth
in Employer Exhibit #5 and, pursuant to my evidentiary ruling,
constitute

post-dismissal charges which were not among the

reasons given the grievant and his Union for his dismissal.
Accordingly they are barred from this Arbitration.

-17OPINION AND AWARD
Based on the foregoing I have concluded that Fineman
engaged in certain irregular and improper acts with regard to
his expense account, his work reports and the use of business
credit cards.

There is no question but that a disciplinary

penalty is justified.

The narrow question is whether there are

circumstances which would mitigate the penalty from discharge to
the lesser penalty of a disciplinary suspension.

By stipulating

that I have authority to fashion a remedy, I deem that the parties
have similarly vested me with the authority to determine whether
the improper acts committed by Fineman more precisely warrant
the ultimate penalty of dismissal or, the lesser, but nonetheless severe penalty of, disciplinary suspension.

For reasons

which I shall particularize, it is my view that a disciplinary
suspension, for the period of time since Fineman1s dismissal,
would more nearly approximate the "just cause" penalty in this
case.
Fineman's misuse of and irregular practices concerning
his expense account, work records, and credit cards is not to
be excused.

Yet, realistically it is not uncommon.

The

characterization of the business expense account as the "swindle
sheet" did not become part of our colloquial lexicon because of
infrequent or isolated abuses.

Rather, and unfortunately it

seems to be an insidious and widespread affliction of some
aspects of a large number of employment relationships.

Hardly

-18a day goes by without some reported offense in this regard, in
both the public and private sectors.

I do not think it would

be far from the mark to speculate that others similarly situated
to Fineman in this and other related employment settings have
engaged in similar practices.

It is well settled that even-

handedness must apply within the same employment relationship.
I think it appropriate herein to extend that rule to cover and
compare the circumstances beyond a single employment setting.
Public officials have been permitted to retire on pension though
they have been found to have committed offenses involving public
funds or in breach of their public trust; and widespread misuse
and misappropriation of public funds in vast social welfare
programs have gone uncorrected and without punishment.

Influence

peddling and the "payoff" have too frequently attended private
sector business negotiations.

When relative comparisons of the

offenses are made and when the penalty will probably preclude
further and future employability elsewhere, I am not persuaded
that discharge is the required penalty to be imposed on a
Fineman for what he did.
More specifically, many of the charges against Fineman
were not among the reasons set forth by the Employer for his
dismissal at the time he was discharged.
proved.

Some others were not

Having dismissed some allegations, and having ruled

others out of this arbitration, it follows that some of the
charges upon which the discharge was based no longer support

-19that action.

And if, on the reasonable assumption that the

Employer imposed the ultimate penalty of dismissal for all the
offenses which it believed Fineman had committed, that a lesser
number of charges are all that may be considered logically warrants
consideration of a lesser penalty as well.
As to one of the principal charges upheld, namely his misuse
of the Air Travel Card, it is undisputed that Fineman has paid the
Employer all the money he owed, so that in that situation the
Employer is not financially damaged.
As this is an industrial relations setting (though on a
more sophisticated level inasmuch as both sides are professionals
in the field), I see no reason why the classical principle of
"progressive discipline" should not apply and why the grievant
should not be given the benefit of the intent of that principle.
At no time was Fineman expressly warned that future unauthorized
or improper use of a credit card, loose or irregular expense
vouchers or falsification of work reports would lead to disciplinary
action including the possibility of dismissal.

True, he was

instructed not to do certain things and he failed to heed those
instructions.

For that he should be penalized.

But he was not

told that his job was in jeopardy if he persisted in those
practices and therefore was not given the kind of impressive notice
upon which disciplinary action, particularly dismissal, is
traditionally

based.

Of course Fineman should have known better.
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But the Employer also should have made it unequivocally

clear

that not only was it dissatisfied with some of his practices but
that discipline including discharge would follow if those practices
did not cease.

Indeed, at the time of Fineman's discharge his

last misuse of the Air Travel Card and his failure to promptly
reimburse NEA the additional $25 from the Denver Airline ticket
had occurred months earlier; and at the time that those offenses
were fresh the Employer had not disciplined him or served notice
on him that they would be treated as a basis for future disciplinary
action, particularly

dismissal.

Again I say this is not to excust

the grievant but rather is solely in justification and explanation
of my judgement that a disciplinary suspension rather than discharge is closer to a "just cause" resolution of this case.
Also, in discipline cases where the propriety of a discharge
is in question, it is always relevant, and in this case I think
appropriate, to consider the employee's work record and his
effectiveness on behalf of his employer in the position he
occupied.

Based on the record before me I am persuaded that

Fineman was a competent and dedicated field representative; that
he worked long hours servicing the local unions under his
jurisdiction; that his work on their behalf was professional and
effective; and that he was and is held in high esteem by
officials of the local unions with which he worked.

His good

record in this regard represents, in my judgement, a legitimate
offset against the offenses which he committed, to an extent that
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would mitigate the discharge to a disciplinary suspension.
Finally, though it is not precisely within my jurisdiction,
I nonetheless venture the view that Fineman's termination might
very well be counterproductive to NYSUl's interests.

Because he

enjoys the confidence and apparent loyality of certain of the
local unions he services (and has been independently retained by
them as their representative since his discharge) it is quite
probable that in this competitive field for the affiliation of
local teacher unions with various national teacher organizations,
his dismissal would cause NYSUl's loss of those local unions to
other national organizations or to independent status.
For all the foregoing reasons it shall be my Award that
Fineman be reinstated to his position as a field representative,
but without back pay.

The period between the discharge and re-

instatement should be deemed a period of suspension. Though
considerable time has elapsed since his discharge, neither side
can be blamed for that.

It took many months for the case to be

tried, for the stenographic record to be transcribed, for briefs
to be filed, and for the Arbitrator to study the record and make
his determinations.

There is no basis to require the Employer

to make any monetary payments to Mr. Fineman for that period of
time and therefore Fineman must bear the monetary loss for the
entire period.

Also, the Award will permit the Employer to

recover from Fineman expenses to which he was not entitled and for
time not worked.
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Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of William W. Fineman
is reduced to a disciplinary suspension.
He shall be reinstated but without back
pay. The period of time from his discharge to his reinstatement shall be
deemed a period of disciplinary suspension.
The Employer may recoup from Mr. Fineman
an amount of money equal to expenses incurred
by his improper use of the telephone credit
card and for working time for which he was
paid on February 7, 1975 when he should have
been at the BOCES meeting but instead was on
personal business.
Disputes over the application and/or implementation
of this Award may be referred to the Undersigned
for resolution.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: April 4, 1977
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this fourth day of April, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Communication Workers of America

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #A-7436
1-74-162

and
New York Telephone Company

In accordance with Article 12 of the collective bargaining
agreement between the New York Telephone Company, hereinafter
referred to as the "Company" and the Communication Workers of
America, District 1, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the
"Union",

the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to

hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Were the qualifications of the grievants and
Kevin Brandt essentially equal? If so, what
shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held on March 31 and April 2, 1975, June 17,
August 3, August 4 and October 27, 1976, and March 24 and June 2,
1977 at which time representatives of the Company and Union
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine

witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The grievants, in order of seniority are: John Zambito,
Roger Gallo, Thomas Leuchner, and William Bergen. .The seniority
of each is superior to that of Kevin Brandt.

The Union asserts

that the group of grievants should also include Roger Tansey.

The

Company disputes his inclusion on the ground that Tansey, in the
opinion of the Company did not specifically indicate a preference
for the geographical area in which the job vacancy was located.

-2The job to which Brandt was promoted and which the Union
asserts should have been awarded to any one of the grievants is
that of Switchman in Huntington, New York.
The Union asserts that each of the grievants, including
Tansey, possessed qualifications at least equal to those of Brandt
and that the Brandt promotion therefore was violative of Section
9.08 of the contract.

That Section reads:

In selecting individuals for permanent promotion to occupational classifications within
the bargaining unit, seniority (determined by
net credited service) shall govern if necessary qualifications are substantially equal. A
claim by the Union that the qualifications of
the individuals in the group which have been
considered for permanent promotion are substantially equal may be processed in accordance with the grievance and arbitration provisions of the Agreement.
Alternatively the Union argues that the Company's methods
of rating the applicants, all of whom were qualified, and its
process of selecting the one applicant among the qualified group
which it believed to be most or better qualified, was violative
of Article 9.08.

In this regard it is the Union's contention

that because all the applicants were qualified they possessed the
"necessary qualifications" within the meaning of Section 9.08,
and that under that circumstance seniority should govern in making
the promotion.
The Company contends that based on its rating system, Brandt
possessed superior qualifications to the grievants and that the
Company's practice and procedure of distinguishing between undisputedly qualified applicants to determine which is better

-3-

qualified, and to implement Section 9008 of the contract accordingly, has been upheld by prior arbitration

decisions.

There is only one job in question, namely the Switchman job
to which Brandt was promoted on January 7, 1974.

If the Company

erred it was by not filling that job with one of the grievants.
The question then is not whether all or some of the grievants
should have been promoted but rather whether one of them based
on qualifications and seniority should have been selected instead
of Brandt.
As I see it then the issue is narrowed to whether, in order
of seniority beginning with Zambito, any of the grievants senior
to Brandt possessed qualifications substantially equal to Brandt
for promotion to the Switchman job.

If Zambito meets this test,

and if not, if any succeeding grievant in seniority meets the
test, then he or the one that does, if any, should have been
promoted to the Switchman job instead of Brandt.
If Zambito or any other grievant is so identified, it would
make unnecessary any consideration herein of whether the Company1
evaluation and rating process and its implementation of Section
9.08 of the contract based on cLose evaluations and ratings was
violative of the contract.

And it would make unnecessary any

consideration by me as to whether in my opinion prior arbitrators
correctly or incorrectly interpreted that contract provision.
Moreover if Zambito met the foregoing test it would make unnecess
ary a determination of the qualifications of any of the other
grievants in comparison to Brandt because there is only one job in

-4dispute, and further because if there are subsequent promotional
openings the remaining grievants would have to be judged for
those openings on the qualifications they possess at that time in
comparison with other bidders for that promotion.

It follows

also that, if Zambito, who was the senior grievant did not meet
the "substantially equal qualifications" test, but some other
grievant in descending order of seniority did, the remaining
grievants would no longer have to be evaluated in this proceeding
in comparison to Brandt.
Finally, by following the foregoing, it would only be
necessary to decide whether Tansey should be included among the
group of grievants, if none senior to Tansey qualified.
Based on an extensive study of the record before me I am
persuaded that I can and therefore choose to proceed on the foregoing basis.

I do so because I find that Zambito possessed

qualifications substantially equal to those of Brandt and that he
instead of Brandt should have been promoted to the Switchman job.
Herbert Yeates, manager of the Nassau and Suffolk Placement
Bureau since 1969 and Administrator of the Upgrade and Transfer
Plan (UTP) since its inception on November 13, 1972 testified
that his unit seeks people in the company to fill vacant positions
shown on a UTP 3 form.

He explained that the Placement Bureau

initially determines from applicants' UTP 1 forms if they have
met the basic qualifications for a requested position. A job
brief specifies the basic qualifications for a position and
Company Exhibit #8, the job brief for switchman, lists four basic
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qualifications for that position: (1) Minimum qualifying scores
for the switchman's job on the Bell System Qualifying Test; (2)
Minimum physical requirements; (3) Satisfactory job performance
rating in the current job; and (4) Satisfactory attendance and
punctuality

record in the current job.

(The Company stipulated

that all grievants in this case have met these basic qualifications) .
Yeates further explained that an applicant must also have
held his current title for a certain length of time before the
Placement Bureau will enter his name into its computer for
promotional consideration.

The last page of the Upgrade and

Transfer Plan booklet, Company Exhibit #11, specifies that
applicants for switchman need twelve months in their current
title for such consideration. Applicants meeting these basic
qualifications and requisite time in title are then evaluated on
a series of "additional factors" mentioned in the job brief:
(1) Outstanding performance rating in current job; (2) Previous
experience or schooling in electrical or electronic field; and
(3) Possession of any technical licenses.
The Upgrade and Transfer Plan Guidelines for Supervision,
Union Exhibit #4 summarizes this process in Section 5.3: "The
(Placement) Bureau determines if the employee meets basic require
ments as outlined in the individual Job Brief and if the employee
has additional factors which indicate qualifications above basic
requirements."

Following this review, the Bureau rates the

-6the employee as: (a) Qualified with additional factors (b)
Qualified (c) Not qualified.

The UTP Guidelines for Placement

Bureaus, Union Exhibit #5 then distinguishes in Section 5.4 (b)
between a qualified candidate who "meets basic requirements for
the job being sought as outlined in the specific Job Brief" and
a qualified-H candidate who "possesses additional job related
factors shown in the Job Brief as well as the basic requirements
or has an outstanding rating in (the) current job."

Indeed,

Yeates noted that the Placement Bureau computer lists promotional candidates as either qualified or qualified plus since his
staff uses these categories in programming the computer after
examining information on the UTP 1 forms.

An evaluator then

determines the best qualified person from the qualified plus
grouping by reviewing the various additional factors.
Josephine Ferris, service clerk supervisor in the Placement
Bureau, actually selected Brandt for the switchman position in
Huntington.

Ms. Ferris stated that she formed her list of

candidates (Company Exhibit #19) from several computer

printouts

including the December 31, 1973 printout (Company Exhibit #13),
the pending file of UTP requests not yet entered into the computer, and the plant coordinator's list of employees appling for
switchman.

She narrowed her list of candidates to those request

ing either Suffolk or Huntington, went to the candidates Individ:

ual files and eventually chose Brandt, a qualified plus candidate
whom she or her. Bureau accorded a qualified plus plus rating
because of additional factors of an "outstanding" appraisal
and schooling and a technical background.

-7Ms. Ferris stated that she further refines the selection process among the qualified plus candidates by distinguishing
between those qualified with an additional factor, and those
qualified with more than one additional factor.
be accorded a qualified-H- rating.

The latter would

She determines the better

qualified++ candidates by looking for the candidate with the most
additional factors.

Among those, if more than one, seniority

would then determine her selection.
All grievants were rated as qualified-l-

since each had a

technical background, but none ranked in the qualified-H- category
like Brandt (Company Exhibit #19).
However, in my view Placement Bureau personnel would have
classified Zambito as qualified-H- if they had considered his
schooling since this represents another "additional factor" under
the Company's system (Company Exhibit #8).
Though Zambito's 1972 UTP 1 form failed to mention any
schooling or training, he claims that he submitted both a 1973
UTP 1 form and a separate 1973 educational form which listed his
RCA schooling in communications electronics, his State University
schooling in mechanical design and his night course in radio and
TV and Wilson Tech.

Company counsel repeatedly noted that a

search of all company records failed to disclose these forms but
acknowledged that the Company did receive a copy of Zambito's 1969
enrollment agreement with RCA (Union Exhibit #8b) on April 16,
1975.

Zambito's 1974 UTP 1 form, Company Exhibit #2, did fully

list his educational background and the education and training
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section of his 1968 employment application, Union Exhibit #26,
mentioned his mechanical design schooling.
The Company defends Zambito's rating based on his 1972 UTP
1 form which the Placement Bureau used in determining his qualifications.

However, it appears that the Company could have

learned about Zambito's schooling if it had sought updated informadition when it tested him for the switchman's position in 1973
(Company Exhibits #15a-c).

Indeed, the UTP status reports show

an attempt by the Company to give Zambito an opportunity to qualify for the switchman's position.

Likewise, then, the Company

could and in my view should have requested more current information from Zambito since the testing procedure necessarily delayed
the introduction of the UTP 1 information into the computer, and
in turn delayed the start of the one year period before the
Company would request a new UTP 1 from Zambito.

Indeed, Ms. Ferris'

meticulous efforts to get current information in making her selection also indicates that the Company recognized the need to rely
on updated and current data.

The fact is that Zambito had under-

taken and completed additional and relevant schooling which would
have affected his overall rating and would, I believe, have placed
him in the same qualified-H- group for promotional

consideration

with Brandt on December, 1973 had information on that schooling
been considered.

I do not think that Zambito should be deprived

of the qualified-H- rating on the technical ground that this
information was not known to the Company at that time, especially

-9when the evidence is inconclusive one way or the other on whether
the Company did not know because Zambito had not informed it, or
because he had but the Company misplaced the notice.
The point is that had Zambito been accorded the qualified-Hstatus, I am satisfied that a consideration of his full record
would have put him on an equal footing with Brandt despite Brandt's
"outstanding" appraisal.

Indeed Zambito's 1974 UTP form shows that

based on his job performance prior to that date, he had officiall^
earned an "outstanding" appraisal also.

I choose to deem that

as reflective of his work performance generally and consistently,"
prior to as well as at that latter date.

.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
John Zambito, as the senior grievant, and
with qualifications substantially equal to
those of Kevin Brandt should have been
promoted to the job of Switchman instead of
Brandt on January 7, 1974. He shall be
promoted to that job and made whole for the
difference in pay.
Only if the Company also retains Brandt as
a Switchman or appoints him to another
Switchman job, will it be necessary to compare the qualifications of the other grievants
with those of Brandt. The Arbitrator retains
jurisdiction for that purpose, in that event.

DATED: October 24, 1977
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this twenty-fourth day of October, 1977, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association
of The City of Newburgh

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #A77 - 43

and
City of Newburgh

In accordance with Article XVI of the collective bargaining agreement dated July 19, 1974 between the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of Newburgh, hereinafter referred to
as the "PBA" and the City of Newburgh, hereinafter referred to as
the "City", the Undersigned was selected as the arbitrator to
hear and decide the following stipulated issues:
1. Did the adoption and use of the socalled "4-40" schedule within the Newburgh
Police Department, specifically the Neighborhood Police Unit, between on or about
April 1, 1975 through November 1, 1976
constitute an illegal schedule pursuant
to Article XV (B) of the Contract and Section
971 of the Unconsolidated Laws of New York?
2. If so, are those members of the Department
who worked that schedule entitled to overtime
pay for the ninth and tenth hours worked on each
tour of duty?
3. Must the "4-2" schedule in effect prior
to April 1, 1975 be reinstituted for the
Neighborhood Police Unit?
A hearing was held at the Newburgh City Hall on August
11, 1977 at which time representatives of the City and the PBA
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

-2Arbitrator's Oath was waived, and the parties agreed to extend
the time for the Arbitrator to render his Award to thirty days
following the close of the hearings.

Certain court decisions and

prior arbitration Awards were submitted subsequent to the oral
hearing.

The hearing was declared closed on August 13, 1977.
For some years prior to on or about April 1, 1975 the

Police Department worked a "4-2" schedule which consisted of
four eight hour days on and two days off, with a rotation system
which extended the regular work week to 37% hours.

This schedule

called for a three-platoon system with one third of the force at
work at any given time.
federal

Prior to April 1, 1975, as a result of a

grant, a Neighborhood Police Unit was established to

work specifically in high crime areas of the City during the
higher crime hours.

On or about April 1, 1975 members

of the

Neighborhood Police Unit, who undisputedly are members of the City
Police Department and covered by the same collective bargaining
agreement as the other members of the force, were put on the
disputed "4-40" schedule.

That schedule involved four ten hour

days on and two days off.

Shortly thereafter the PBA challenged

in actions in the courts changes in the work schedule of the entire Department.

Court decisions were rendered in May and October

of 195, but neither decision dealt determinatively with the "4-40"
schedule of the Neighborhood Police Unit.

On October 7, 1976

the PBA filed a grievance under the contract challenging the "440" schedule for the Neighborhood Police Unit and on November 1st
the City put the entire Department including the Neighborhood
Police Unit on a new "4-2"

schedule.

-3During the course of the arbitration hearing the City
conceded that the "4-40" schedule was "inconsistent" with Section
971 of the Unconsolidated Laws of New York.

Inasmuch as it was

also stipulated that that statute prescribes a work day of no
more than eight hours and the "4-40" schedule requires four work
days of ten hours each, I deem that concession by the City was an
admission that the "4-40" schedule from on or about April 1, 1975
through November 1, 1976 was "illegal" within the meaning of the
stipulated issue.
Based on the candid testimony of the City's then Police
Commissioner I also conclude that for the same period of time the
"4-40" schedule was violative of the collective bargaining agreement.

Commissioner Taylor testified that when he thought he had

a "gentlemen's agreement" with the PBA to implement the "4-40"
schedule for the entire Department, the PBA officials told him
that they could not prevent a grievance challenging that schedule
and if a grievance was filed the Department "would have to revert
to a lawful schedule."

The Commissioner stated that he told the

Neighborhood Police Unit that "if a grievance was filed the "440' schedule would cease."

(The City does not claim in this

proceeding that it reached agreement with the PBA on a "4-40"
schedule for any members of the force.)
I interpret the Commissioner's statements as recognition
by him and by the City that the "4-40" schedule could not success
fully withstand the processing of a grievance.

Inasmuch as a

grievance involves an alleged breach of the Contract, the City

-4thereby acknowledged that the "4-40" schedule constituted a
contract breach within the definition of a grievance.
Moreover, as a matter of law, the collective bargaining
agreement contemplates an employment relationship which in all
respects is lawful.

No contract provision or condition of

employment, whether bilaterally negotiated or unilaterally promulgated, should or may be enforced in arbitration if it is unlawful.

Specifically, the work schedule of the police officers

under this contractual relationship, whether mandatory subjects
of collective bargaining or not must be lawful; otherwise in my
view, any such schedule would not only violate the statute but
could not be supported under this contract.
Hence I conclude that the City's change to and its
implementation of a "4-40" schedule for the Neighborhood Police
Unit was contrary to the scheme and intent of the collective
bargaining relationship between the parties and hence in that
respect at least violative of the contract.
Though I will deal with it in response to Issue No. 3, I
do not find it necessary in view of the foregoing, to presently
determine whether the prior "4-2" schedule which was replaced by
the "4-40" schedule was a protected "working condition" which
could not be unilaterally changed under the provisions of Article
XV (B) of the contract.
The PBA seeks overtime pay for the ninth and tenth hours
worked by the members of the Neighborhood Police Unit during the

-5period of time that the "4-40" schedule was in effect.
pleads "laches" and "inability to pay."

The City

It also asserts that

the affected employees should not receive overtime because they
entered the Neighborhood Police Unit voluntarily.
That some of the Neighborhood Police Unit members may
have volunteered for the program is immaterial.

Whether a

volunteer or not, the collective bargaining agreement applies
with equal force and effect.

It is well settled that an employer

may not make special arrangements with any employee covered by a
collective bargaining agreement which is different from the contractual terms or inconsistent therewith, except by direct agreement with the bargaining agent.
no

Here the City and the PBA reached

agreement on the "4-40" schedule and whether or not some of

the members of the Neighborhood Police Unit found that schedule
to their liking in no way prejudices the PBA's right to challenge
its validity under the contract.
Inability to pay, though an important and relevant
factor in the negotiation of a collective agreement, in factfinding recommendations towards the completion of any such agreement and in the arbitration of

interest disputes where terms

and conditions of a contract are legislated by an arbitrator,
is not a recognized defense to a contract breach.

Where the

parties have bilaterally negotiated a contract provision, and
where money damages is the ordinary and recognized remedy for a
breach, inability of the offending party to pay those damages
is neither a defense to a cause of action nor to a judgement.

-6Any other rule would mean that contracts, both labor and commercial, could be breached with impunity and the process of obtaining a judgement rendered meaningless, whenever the defendant or
respondent is financially unable to pay money damages.
I have no doubt that the City is faced with a grave
fiscal crisis and that its budget does not presently contain
funds to pay the overtime claims.

But relief from a financial

obligation which is founded on a contract provision, namely that
it would pay overtime of time and one-half for all hours worked
in excess of one-half an hour beyond a policeman's regular daily
schedule, may be obtained only from agreement with the PBA, or
from the legislature or possibly the courts.

The arbitrator,

whose responsibility and power is confined to the interpretation
and enforcement of the contract lacks the authority to grant any
such relief.
Moreover, the City had good reason to know that it
might incur overtime liabilities when it installed the "4-40"
schedule.

It told the Neighborhood Police Unit that if a

grievance was filed it would terminate that schedule.

That the

PBA filed a lawsuit instead of a grievance challenging the "440" schedule did not lessen

PBA's objection to that schedule

nor did it diminish notice to the City of that objection.
As I see it the lawsuite served notice not only of the
PBA's objection to the schedule but also to the reasonable
probability that there would be a claim for money damages.

At

that point the City could and I believe should have mitigated

-7its damages by treating the lawsuit as a "constructive grievance
and ended the "4-40" schedule, as it said it would if a grievance
was filed and in accordance with its recognition that it was
statutorily and contractually improper.

But it did not.

It

retained the schedule throughout the lawsuits, presumably on the
technical ground that the litigation was not a "grievance."
Misplaced reliance on that technicality put the City knowingly
in a position where monetary liability continued to accrue well
past the point the City could have stopped it.

So, if extensive

monetary liability has accrued in the form of overtime pay, it
is largely of the City's own making.
The Arbitrator is bound to the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement.

Article VI (B) calls for overtime pay at

time and one-half for work in excess of one-half an hour beyond
a normal tour.

Having found that the "4-40" schedule, which

required a work day of ten hours to be both statutorily and
contractually

improper, it follows that the ninth and tenth hours

worked by the members of the Neighborhood Police Unit was time
in excess of their normal tour.
The City's defense of "laches" to the claim for overtime pay is not tenable.

The contract sets forth no specific

time limits to the filing of a grievance.

The City has not

shown any of the traditional conditions upon which the equitable
defense of laches rests.

Neither witnesses nor evidence has

become unavilable due to the passage of time, nor has the City
been lulled into a false sense of security that the PBA did not
object to the "4-40" schedule. The fact is that the PBA did not

-8"sleep on its rights."

It commenced suit shortly after the

schedule was implemented and maintained two actions in the courts
realting to the work schedule of the Department.

As

defendant,

the City was fully cognizant of the lawsuits, the substance of
the PBA's challenge, and knew or should have known that if the
litigation was procedurally premature an action would at some
point be commenced under the grievance procedure of the contract
and in the arbitration forum.
For the foregoing reasons I must reject the City's
reliance on the theory of laches, its defense of inability to
pay, and its claim of immunity from overtime payments because
members of the Neighborhood Police Unit voluntarily accepted the
"4-40" work schedule.
As the contract explicitly requires overtime pay at the
rate of time and one-half for work performed beyond the end of a
normal tour in excess of one-half an hour, and having found that
the "4-40" schedule which required a ninth and tenth hour of work
each day to be violative of both the law and the contract, the
Arbitrator has no choice but to direct the City to pay overtime
to those members of the Neighborhood Police Unit who worked a
ninth and tenth hour on the "4-40" schedule during the period
involved.

(It is stipulated that the affected employees were

paid at straight time for those hours so that what is due them
is the additional one-half time).
Whether the original "4-2" schedule should be reinstated
for the Neighborhood Police Unit depends on whether it was a
"working condition" within the meaning of Article XV (B), which

-9may not be changed unless "written and signed by both parties
as an addenda to (the) Agreement...."
The original "4-2" schedule which obtained for years up
to on or about April 1, 1975 was undisputedly lawful.

The new

"4-2" schedule is different in that it utilizes a four-platoon
rather than a three-platoon system and changes the starting and
ending times of the shift hours of the employees.
The contract does not expressly refer to the original
"4-2" schedule, so its inviolability is dependant on whether it
is incorporated in and preserved for the life of the contract by
the language of Article XV

(B).

It is significant to my mind that Article XV (B) uses
the phrase "Working Conditions" not "Conditions of Employment",
both in its caption and in the body of its text.

The latter

phrase of course, is the express legal term which defines a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining and a condition which
may not be unilaterally determined or changed without bilateral
bargaining, whether in contract negotiations or during the contract life.

That explicit phrase is used both in the Taylor Act

and in the National Labor Relations Act as Amended.
It seems to me that had the parties intended Article
XV (B) to apply only to the statutory mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining, they could and should have used the phrase
that means just that.

But they did not.

Instead, they used a

phrase which is more general, of broader scope and less legally
restrictive.

-10In my view "Working Conditions" encompasses more than
the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.

If for the

sake of argument a work schedule is a managerial prerogative
and a permissive subject of bargaining, it is nonetheless a
"working condition" though unilaterally initiated by the City.
And where, as here, the parties mutually negotiated an enforceable contract clause perpetuating working condition unless
changed by written mutual agreement, that clause freezes those
conditions which aremanagerially rooted as well as those bilaterally negotiated.

It is also noted that the clause refers

to "all working conditions."

(emphasis added).

means the broad range of conditions,

To my mind that

rules, regulations and

policies under which the employees work irrespective of the
mandatory or permissive nature as bargaining issues.

For example,

it is well settled that an employer may unilaterally promulgate
and enforce working rules, provided they are reasonable, related
to the jobs involved, well disseminated and even handedly enforced.

I doubt that the City would contend that any such work-

ing rules which govern the conduct of employees on the job would
not be "Working Conditions" within the meaning of Article XV (B)
And yet such rules, as a matter of collective bargaining law,
are generally held to be a managerial prerogative which need not
be bilaterally bargained with the union.
The record does not disclose how the original "4-2"
schedule was installed.

However that does not matter.

Whether

jointly negotiated or unilaterally implemented by the City, it

-11falls within the ambit of "all working conditions" with which
Article XV (B) is concerned.

Therefore it is unnecessary

in this

proceeding for me to decide whether the new "4-2" schedule is a
retained management right and a permissive subject for bargaining
or whether it is a condition of employment in the nature of
"hours" or another mandatory subject, requiring bilateral negotiations with the PBA.

I need not do so because in either event

I find that the original "4-2" schedule was a "working condition"
within the broad and general meaning of Article XV (B) of the
contract.
Article XV (B) is clear and explicit.

It reads:

WORKING CONDITIONS: All working conditions
for the duration of this contract shall remain the same as they presently exist, unless
said change is written and signed by both
parties as an addenda to this Agreement with
the two principals involved, namely the
Employer and the Association.
There has been no agreement in writing changing the
original "4-2" schedule to the different "4-2" schedule which is
now in effect.

Inasmuch as there are substantive differences

between the two schedules I must conclude that the latter represents a change from the former.

Absent mutual written agreement,

that change, effectuated unilaterally by the City violated
Article XV (B).
This Arbitrator is sympathetic with the City's desire
to get more police on the streets during the high crime periods
and in higher crime areas, and also to utilize its work force as
productively as is reasonably possible.

But the arbitration

-12forum lacks the jurisdiction to either legislate or affirm schedule changes which though more flexible and perhaps more realistic
in the furtherance of fighting crime, are unlawful and/or contrary
to what the parties agreed to in and by their collective bargaining relationship.

If the City seeks these results, and is frustr i

ted by this decision, the frustration issimply a reflection of
the collective bargaining agreement which they negotiated with
the PBA.

A change must be obtained through direct negotiations

with the PBA or may be a matter for legislation or possibly the
courts, but it is beyond the jurisdiction of a grievance
arbitrator.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
1. The adoption and use of the so-called
"4-40" schedule within the Newburgh Police
Department, specifically in the Neighborhood Police Unit, between on or about April
1. 1975 through November 1, 1976 constituted
an illegal schedule pursuant to Section 971
of the Unconsolidated Laws of New York and
violated the collective bargaining agreement.
2. Those members of the Department who worked
that schedule are entitled to overtime pay
for the ninth and tenth hours worked on each
tour of duty.
3. The "4-2" schedule in effect prior to
April 1, 1975 must be reinstituted for the
Neighborhood Police Unit.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 8, 1977
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this the eighth day of September, 1977 before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

FEEKRAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
The International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local 1992,

OPINION AND AWARD
Cage #77^3749

and
The Okonite Company

In accordance with Article XVII of the collective bargaining agreement dated July 27, 1975 between the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1992, hereinafter referred to as
the "Union", and the Okonite Company, hereinafter referred to as
the "Company", the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Did the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement by not allowing the Lead Extruder
Operators, Lead Extruder Helpers and Lead Stripper
Operator in the Lead Department to perform a Lead
Stripper Helper assignment in the same Department?
If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in East Brunswick, New Jersey on September 26, 1977 at which time representatives of the Union and
Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
Sometime in December of 1976 when work in the classifications
of Lead Extruder Operator, Lead Extruder Helper and Lead Stripper
Operator temporarily ran out, the foreman in the Lead Department
assigned available Lead Stripper Helper work to the Vulcanizer
Operator, another classification in that Department, and denied

-2-

that work to the employees of the foregoing classifications.

Those

employees are the grievants herein.
The Union contends that the Company's action violated a
long standing practice which predated December, 1976 and also
violated Article XIII Sections 1 and 2 of the collective bargaining agreement.
The Company asserts that the disputed work is properly
within the Vulcanizer Operator job.

It denies that the practice

has been to consistently and exclusively assign Lead Stripper
Helper work to the grievants; but rather that since the elimination of the Lead Stripper Helper classification assignments have
been given to both the Vulcanizer and to the grievants not only
when the Department was fully occupied but also when work ran
out in the grievant's classifications.
The Company argues that Article XIII is inapplicable because it relates to the procedures to be followed in the event of
a "reduction of work force" and that in the instant case there
was no work force reduction although one or more of the grievants
were transferred to other available work outside of the Lead
Department until work in their regular classifications again became available.
Additionally the Company asserts that the grievants are not
qualified to "bump" the Vulcanizer Operator because they cannot
perform the Vulcanizing process, and that the Lead Stripper Helper
work is only a minor part of the Vulcanizer's overall assignment.

-3-

As I see it, the critical questions involved in this case
were decided by Arbitrator Thomas A. Knowlton in his Award of
May 14, 1968.

Mr. Knowlton held that the Company had the right

to add the work of the Lead Stripper Helper to that of the
Vulcanizer Operator.

And because of that combination the Company

was directed to raise the job level of the Vulcanizer Operator
from Level 4 to Level 6 with an appropriate pay increase.

In

short I find that Mr. Knowlton1s Award made the Lead Stripper
Helper job a part of the work of the Vulcanizer Operator by
permitting the Company to incorporate the Helper's work within the
Vulcanizer Operator classification.

Obviously, the effect of

Mr. Knowlton's Award was to permit the elimination or deactivation of the Lead Stripper Helper classification and to make his
prior duties an integral part of the active Vulcanizer Operator
classification.

Hence, since the Knowlton Award the disputed

work has properly belonged to the Vulcanizer Operator.

Inasmuch

as arbitration decisions, unless vacated, mutually disregarded
or changed by bilateral negotiations become a binding part of
the collective bargaining relationship, the Company has the
contractual right to assign that work to the Vulcanizer to the
exclusion of the grievants.
Even assuming that the practice has been as the Union
asserts, it would not change that conclusion.

For it is well

settled that a practice does not prevail over explicit contract
language or explicit contract interpretations that are contrary.

-4Past practice obtains prospectively only if the contract or its
interpretation is ambiguous.

Here the Knowlton Award is clear

and explicit and constitutes a binding contract interpretation.
Therefore any practice to the contrary does not prevail over the
Company's decision on and after December 1976 to assign the disputed work to the Vulcanizer Operator even when the grievants ran
out of work in the Lead Department.

Put another way, the Company

may in its discretion, and apparently has, assigned Lead Stripper
Helper work to the grievants, but I do not find that it has a
contractual obligation to do so in view of Mr. Knowlton's Award
making the disputed work officially part of the Vulcanizer Operator
classification.
Finally, I do not find a breach of Article XIII Sections
1 or 2 simply because those sections are activated when "it
becomes necessary.... to reduce the working force" (Section 1),
and "when it is necessary

to curtail work on an operation

because of a temporary condition, requiring temporary reduction
in the work force" (Section 2). (Emphasis added.)

In the instant

case there was no reduction in the work force; but rather pursuant
to a practice not covered by Article XIII, employees temporarily
without work are and have been transferred to other assignments
without any consideration to laying them off.

Hence under that

practice there is and has not been any "reduction in the work
force" and therefore the basic condition precedent to the applicability of Sections 1 and 2 of Article XIII has not occurred.

-5Even assuming the arguable applicability of the first two
paragraphs of Section 2 of Article XIII, the grievants would not
be eligible to displace the Vulcai izer Operator on the Lead Stripper
Helper work, simply because that work has become an integral part
of the Vulcanizer Operator's job in accordance with Mr. Knowlton's
Award, and for the grievants to claim any right to that assignment
would require that they possess the ability to perform all the
work which the Vulcanizer Operator performs.

It is undisputed

herein that the grievants do not possess those full qualifications.
Only if the Lead Stripper Helper work was not part of the Vulcanizer
Operator job, might the grievants, and the Union on their behalf
have a credible argument under Section 2 of Article XIII.

But

that has not been either the factual or contractual circumstance
since Mr. Knowlton's Award.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement by not allowing the
Lead Extruder Operators, Lead Extruder
Helpers and Lead Stripper Operator in the
Lead Department to perform a Lead Stripper
Helper assignment in the same Department.

DATED: October 7, 1977
COUNTY OF New York )
OQ .
. o0 • •
STATE OF New York
)

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this seventh day of October, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 467 IUE, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case # 1330 0186 77

and
Organon, Inc.

In accordance with Article XII of the collective bargaining
agreement dated June 1, 1974 between Organon, Inc., hereinafter
referred to as the "Company", and Local 467, IUE, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union", the Undersigned was selected
as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated
issues :
1. Was there just cause for the discharge of
Vincent Carsillo? If not what shall be the
remedy ?
2. Whether the assessment of disciplinary points
against employees Arthur Kellerman (twelve
points), Frank Wojcek (twelve points), Paul
Cova (twelve points), James McKenzie (six
points), was proper under the collective bargaining agreement? If not what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held at the Company offices in West Orange,
New Jersey, on April 20th and June 7th, 1977.

At those hearings

Mr. Carsillo, hereinafter referred to as "Carsillo", Messrs.
Kellerman, Wojcek, Cova and McKenzie, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievants", and representatives of the Union and Company
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
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The two issues are interrelated.

Carsillo, a union steward,

at the time of his termination is charged with instructing the
grievants not to accept overtime assignments.

As a consequence

the grievants declined an overtime call-in on the night of
December 27th and the morning of December 28th, 1976 to remove
what the Company anticipated to be a heavy accumulation of snow.
The Company contends that Carsillo and the grievants violated the
"no-strike" provisions of Article XXIX of the collective bargainin;
agreement.
The Company asserts that the call-in to perform snow removal constituted emergency overtime and that the grievants' refusal was a direct consequence of instructions from Carsillo not
to perform any overtime requested by the Company.

Viewing Carsill

as the instigator, the Company deems his discharge proper.

The

grievants, whom the Company claims followed Carsillo's instructions were assessed discipline under a disciplinary point system
which in and of itself is not challenged in this proceeding.
There is no dispute between the parties over the procedure
to be followed in obtaining employees for emergency overtime.

The

Company calls employees on a overtime list and requests their
attendance to perform the required work.

Under the contract,

under prior Arbitration Awards, and in accordance with undisputed
procedures, if the Company is unable to obtain the required number
of employees by requesting their attendance, it may then direct
and require the junior employees on the list to report for work

-3-

in the numbers required.
The problem with the Company's case herein is that it did
not follow to completion its rights under this procedure.
Based on the evidence I am persuaded that Carsillo informed
the grievants not to perform "voluntary overtime."

The bulk of

the Company's testimony, together with the testimony of certain
of the grievants abundantly discloses that the grievant instructec
employees not to accept "voluntary overtime."

Carsillo"s purpose

and objective, persuant to instructions from his Union representatives, apparently was to frustrate any effort by the Company to
accumulate inventories during contract negotiations and on the
eve of what appeared to be an imminent strike.

However, there is

insufficient evidence (most of it of the hearsay type) that
Carsillo expressly instructed the grievants not to perform snow
removal on an emergency basis.

But assuming arguendo that his

instructions to his fellow Union members included specific
instructions not to comply with the Company's request to report
in for snow removal on the night in question, I am satisified
nonetheless that the extent of his instructions was still within
the ambit of "voluntary overtime" and did not extend to instructing his fellow members not to report to work if ordered to do so.
The crucial fact is that the Company never put Carsillo's
instructions to the requisite test.

It called each of the

grievants and requested them or asked them if they would be willing to come in to work to remove snow.

Faced with declinations

-4from each, the Company never ordered or directed any of them,
including those junior in seniority, to report to work.

The

Company's explanation is that never before had it been necessary
to take the final step-to order junior employees in in response
to a need for emergency overtime, and that in the instant case
it would have been useless to do so in view of Carsillo's instruc
tions.

That position of the Company is speculative.

cannot be founded on speculation.

Discipline

It is impossible to tell with

certainty whether any of the grievants, if ordered to report,
would have persisted in their refusal to report in the face of an
order to do so and at the risk of disciplinary

penalties.

At best what Carsillo told the grievants was ambiguous.
If limited to "voluntary overtime", he did nothing wrong0

For

if employees may accept or reject overtime when it is only requested of them, particularly if they are more senior employees,
instructions from their Union or from a union steward that they
should not voluntarily accept overtime is nothing more than an
affirmation of the rights of the employees and the right of the
Union on their behalf to decline that request.

That Carsillo's

instructions might be construed as a directive to the grievants
not to perform any overtime, whether requested or ordered, is
not only not supported by the requisite evidence to meet the
Company's burden in displinary cases, but cannot be imputed to
Carsillo until and unless the grievants, and particularly the
junior grievants refuse a direct order to report for work.

Here

-5no such order was given.
ambiguous.

So, Carsillo's instructions

remain

That ambiguity is not resolved to his disadvantage

in view of the fact that the Company never "put the matter to the
test" as it had a right to do, and should have done, by ordering
the required number of junior employees to report for snow
removal.
As I am sure the Company well knows, it has the burden of
establishing just cause for discharges and for the imposition of
displinary penalties by a quantum of proof that is clear and
convincing.

Had the Company exercised its rights fully under the

emergency procedures; had it ordered the junior employees to
report, following its inability to obtain recalls among the
grievants on a request basis, the evidence would have been more
compelling that Carsillo instructed the grievants not to accept
any overtime, whether voluntary or mandatory, and the refusal
of the junior grievants to comply with the order would have been
violative of Article XXIX of the contract and evidence of Carsillo's
instigation of that contract breach.
As I see it, the prescribed and unchallenged procedure
which accords the Company the right to require the attendance of
junior employees to perform emergency overtime when more senior
employees decline, was established precisely to meet the kind of
circumstances present in the instant case.

That the Company never

before had difficulty obtaining a sufficient number of employees

-6on a voluntary basis does not excuse it from the requirement of
asserting its right to require attendance before it takes
disciplinary action.

The Company cannot establish just cause

either for a discharge or for disciplinary penalties when if
it had exercised its rights the problem might have been obviated
or if not, evidentiary inferences could then have been drawn
regarding Carsillo's culpability and the willful cooperation of
the grievants in the contract breach.
In summary, the evidence goes only so far as to show that
Carsillo instructed the grievants to decline "voluntary overtime,"
Inasmuch as employees are permitted to do so, Carsillo committed
no offense in that regard.

That his instructions may have gone

further is at best ambiguous and not established by the requisit
evidence for discharge cases.

The Company had the right to order

the junior grievants in, but failed to exercise that right.

Its

assumption that they would not have responded to an order and to
the threat of discipline, as they declined to respond to a
request that they report, is too speculative to support disciplinary penalties.

And having failed to "put the matter to, the

test", by completing the procedural cycle for the performance of
emergency overtime, the Company failed to acquire the evidence
needed to establish a breach of Article XXIX either by Carsillo
or by the grievants.
Accordingly, Carsillo's discharge and the discipline

-7assessed against the grievants are reversed.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
1.

There was not just cause for the discharge
of Vincent Carsillo. He shall be reinstated
with full back pay and full benefits.

2.

The disciplinary points assessed against Arthur
KeHerman, Frank Wojcek, Paul Cova and James
McKenzie shall be expunged from their records.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: July 19, 1977
STATE OF: New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF: New York)
On this nineteenth day of July, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 381, Folding Box Corrugated Box
And Display Workers, United Paperworkers
International Union, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 1549 76

and
Packaging Corporation of America

In accordance with Article 13 of the collective bargaining
agreement dated April 1, 1975 to March 31, 1977 between the above
named Union and Company, the Undersigned was designated as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
1. Would the Company violate the contract
by eliminating the job of Adhesive Mixer
and combining its duties with that of the
Raw Material Handler? If so what shall be
the remedy?
2. Whether the Company's modification of
crew utilization on the Flexo-Folder Gluer
constitutes a material change in methods of
performing work on that machine and whether
or not it creates a safety hazard? If so what
shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held at the Company offices in Clifton, New
Jersey on March 28th and April 4th, 1977, at which time represent
atives of the Union and Company appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Union's complaint on Issue No. 1 is that the combining
of the adhesive mixer duties with those of the raw material
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handler and the elimination of the former job constitutes a
violation of Articles 2.3, 10.1 and 11.3 of the contract.
As to Issue No. 2 the Union relies on the same contract
section in objecting to the assignment to the operator of the
Flexo-Folder Gluer the additional duty of assisting the Feeder
when certain large size corrugated material is fed into the
machine to be produced into boxes.

Also on this issue the Union

contends that when the Operator is located at the Feeder
position he is subjected to a safety hazard from nearby fork
lift trucks and from a track attached to the floor over which he
must step to perform his other regular duties at various locations
The Union seeks an order prohibiting the Company from
combining the duties of the Adhesive Mixer with those of the Raw
Material Handler, and a reversal of the assignment of the
requirement that the operator of the Flexo-Folder Gluer assist
the Feeder under conditions previously mentioned.
As I see it the overriding and determinative

contract

provision, applicable to both issues is Article 11.1 of the
contract which reads :_
Operating Control
The Company shall be the exclusive judge
of all matters pertaining to the product
to be manufactured, the location of the
plant, the schedules of production and the
methods, process, means and materials to
be used. (Emphasis added).
The Company's plan to combine the duties of the Adhesive
•',_:!•

Mixer with those of the Raw Material Handler, and then to

-3eliminate the former job is an exercise of its managerial
prerogative to determine the "methods, process, means

to

be used."
Similarly, the requirement that the operator of the FlexoFolder Gluer take on the additional duty of assisting the Feeder
when large corrugated material is introduced into the operation
is a determination by the Company of the "methods, process and
means to be used" in the operation of that machine.

Article 11.

expressly reserves such decisions and their implementation to
the Company.
I do not find a violation of Section 2.3 of the contract.
None of the work involved has been turned over to non-bargaining
unit employees, and hence there is no encroachment on the
recognition of the Union as the bargaining agent for the unit.
Also, I do not read Section 2.3 as guaranteeing the active
maintenance of all jobs listed in Exhibit A.
clauses are traditionally

Such recognition

interpreted to mean that when and if

certain enumerated job classifications are actively worked,
employees assigned to the duties thereof must be members of the
bargaining unit and the Union has recognition and jurisdiction
over those employees and the work they perform.
Indeed Article 10.1 clearly permits the Company to
establish new jobs without limitation on where the duties for
those new jobs originate.

Therefore not only may the Company

establish new jobs consisting of duties not previously performed
in the plant, but may create new jobs by combining the existing

-4duties of other existing job classifications.

In that event

the Company is obligated to fill the job in accordance with the
provisions of Article 10.1 and if applicable to establish
standards of performance in accordance with Article 11.4.
Filling a new job or a vacancy under Article 10.1 and the
establishment and accuracy of performance standards under
Article 11.4 are matters over which the Union may grieve and
are subject to review under the grievance and arbitration
provisions of the contract.

In the instant case the Union does i

not challenge the standards in this proceeding, and accordingly
its rights to do so, if any, are reserved.

However I do find

that the combined job resulting from the transfers of the duties
of the Adhesive Mixer to the Raw Material Handler would expand
the latter's duties sufficiently to constitute the creation of
a new job within the meaning of Article 10.1 of the contract.
My Award herein will deal with that.
For the same foreoing reasons I do not find a violation
of Article 2.3 in connection with the expanded duties of the
operator of the Flexo-Folder Gluer, nor do I find that his
additional function of assisting the Feeder on those occasions
when larger corrugated material is fed into the machine
sufficiently

expands the duties of his job to constitute a new

job within the meaning of Article 10.1.
Though the Union relies on Article 11.3 in both instances,

-5I do not find that section applicable to either dispute. Neither
issue involves a discharge or other disciplinary penalties.
Nor do they involve employee transfers.

That Article 11.3

relates also to layoffs is inapposite inasmuch as the propriety
of the layoff of the Adhesive Mixer rests on the right of the
Company to combine that job with the job of Material Handler.
Having held that the Company acted properly in effectuating
the combination, the consequent
of Article 11.3.

layoff would not be violative

In the second issue there was no disciplinary

action,, layoff or transfer.
For the foregoing reasons I do not find contract violations
by the action contemplated under Issue No. 1, or the action
taken by the Company under Issue No. 2.

The evidence and the

testimony on Issues 1 and 2 together with my observations of
the operation of the Flexo-Folder Gluer are and were not
sufficiently extensive for me to conclude that the Material
Handler or the Operator are overworked with their additional
duties or that the latter is exposed to a serious safety hazard
However the rights of the Union, if any, to challenge the work
load; to challenge the accuracy of the standards and to challenge
safety conditions are reserved, either under the collective
bargaining agreement or in other appropriate forums.
The foregoing should not be construed by the Company as
a license to arbitrarily combine jobs or to change the work
duties of existing classifications.

Rather I find that the

-6Company's right to make the changes herein is based upon an
implicit condition of economic need, and restricted to reasonable work loads and work standards.

In the instant case the

Company has made out a prima facia case of economic

necessity

for the action it took, and has reasonably demonstrated that
both the Raw Material Handler and the Flexo-Folder Gluer have
adequate time within the normal work day to perform the additional assigned duties on a reasonable basis.

However, absent

a showing of economic need, and that the additional duties do
not represent an unreasonable work load, this Arbitrator would
not uphold job combinations or arbitrary changes in work
assignments within classifications.
Accordingly the Undersigned duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
1. The Company would not violate the
contract by eliminating the job of
Adhesive Mixer and combining its duties
with that of the Raw Material Handler.
However the combination constitutes a new
job within the meaning of Article 10.1 of
the contract and must be filled in accordance with the procedures set forth therein.
2. The Company's modification of crew
utilization on the Flexo-Folder Gluer does
not constitute a material change in methods
of performing work on that machine in
violation of the contract, and so far as
the record before me is concerned, does
not create a safety hazard.
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The rights of the Union, if any, as
specified in the Opinion; relating to
production standards, work loads, and
safety are reserved for review under the
collective bargaining agreement or in
any other appropriate forum.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: April 18, 1977
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this eighteenth day of April, 1977, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
•—• — — — — . • — — — _ — • — — — ™.™.— — — «-.-..__.™™ _ _ _ _ „ . — _ _ ^ _ M _ ^ — .

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Administrative, Professional and
Technical Association-District Council 47
American Federation of State County and
Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #14 30 1277 76 J

and
The City of Philadelphia (Water Department)

In accordance with Sections 7 and 8 of the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named parties the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the
grievances of Joseph E. Jones, Norman E. Parnell, Jr. and
Franklin D. Bradley, all classified as Chemists I.
A hearing was held on March 2, 1977 at the offices of the
American Arbitration Association in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Representatives of the Union and City appeared

and were affordec

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.
On behalf of the three grievants, the Union claims that
the City violated Section 9 of the contract by discontinuing a
long standing procedure of covering the first day of an unexpected
or emergency absence of a chemist assigned to the day shift, by
holding over a chemist (or chemical technician) who has worked
the immediately preceding night shift, thereby assigning the
latter employee to two consecutive work shifts.

-2The Union contends that this procedure is a "past practice"
within the meaning of Section 9 of the contract, and may not be
unilaterally terminated by the City.

Section 9 reads:

PAST PRACTICE
A. It is agreed that the terms or conditions
of employment as specified in the Civil
Service Regulations or formal and/or written
agreements prevailing prior to this agreement
which are in any respect more favorable to
the bargaining unit than agreed upon terms or
conditions in this agreement shall continue
in full force and effect and shall not be
considered as terminated or modified in any
way by this agreement unless the modification
or termination is mutually agreed upon.
The threshold question is whether the foregoing undisputed
procedure or practice, which concedely was followed by the City
from 1959 until unilaterally discontinued in February of 1976,
was a "past practice" within the contract definition of Section
9.

An answer in the negative to this threshold question would

be dispositive of the instant grievances without need to discuss
and determine the other respective arguments and contentions of
the parties.
Though the consistent practice of holding over a third
shift chemist to cover an unexpected vacancy or absence on the
first shift, for the first day of that absence, may constitute
a past practice within a customary or classical definition, I
must conclude however that it does not meet the contractual test
or definition of a past practice under this collective bargaining
agreement.

Pertinent to this dispute, Section 9 defines past

practice as
"formal and/or written agreements

prevailing

-3prior to this agreement...."
Hence it is not determinative if the practice or procedure involved in this case is an unvaried course of conduct of long
standing duration followed by both sides.

What is determinative

one way or the other, is whether that practice or procedure
meets the test of a "formal and/or written agreement."
is no

There

serious dispute over the fact that it was not a written

agreement.

It took the form of a memorandum unilaterally

promulgated by the City in 1959; then changed by the City's
unilateral memoranda in February and April, 1976.

At no time

did the writings of the City become transformed into a bilateral
written agreement.
Though the word "formal" is less precise, it cannot be
disregarded because the parties explicitly included it in
Section 9 as one definition of a contractual "past practice."
The relevant dictionary definition of "formal" is:
characterized by due form; done in due
form; ceremonial.
Coupled with the word "agreement" which means:
an exchange of promises; mutual understanding; reciprocal promises;
it is apparent to me that the parties meant a bilateral understanding; mutually expressed by one side to the other in the
form of an explicit exchange of conditions and terms, albeit oral,

-4I do not believe that the foregoing analysis is overtechnical.

The Arbitrator is bound to the provisions of the

contract which the parties have negotiated.

Where they have

used special words or a special definition of what constitutes
a contractual "past practice", the Arbitrator is obligated to
apply those words or that definition and may not disregard the
consequent intent or import, even if different from other
traditional definitions of the same phrase.
The instant procedure of holding over a night shift
chemist to cover the first day of an unexpected or emergency
absence of a day shift chemist did not become a formal agreement within the foregoing definition.
1959 before the Union was certified.

The procedure began in
It was unilaterally

promulgated by the City and thereafter followed by the Union
and its members after the Union came on the scene.

At no time,

based on the evidence in this case, did the parties expressly
exchange statements or understandings regarding such things
as implementation or continuation

of, or mutual obligations

under that procedure.
What the Union seeks in this arbitration is a ruling
which would require the City to hold over a night shift chemist
to cover a day shift vacancy whether or not there was work for
that chemist to perform, and regardless of whether the City
deemed such coverage necessary.

The City asserts that any such

ruling or requirement would impermissibly encroach on its

-5managerial right to determine how many employees it needs at
any given time and what work shall be performed.

It is clear

that an affirmation of the Union's case would have that effect,
at least for the first day of an unexpected absence.

At the

hearing the Union frankly acknowledged this result, but took
the position that it was contractually mandated by Section 9
and therefore enforceable as a contractual limition on the City's
managerial right to direct the work force.
In my judgement, the result which the Union seeks, and
which the Union contends is supported by Section 9 of the contract, requires more evidence of the establishment of a "formal
agreement" than the facts in this case show.

In other

words, a procedure unilaterally inaugurated by the City in
1959; thereafter followed by the affected employees; and then
terminated and modified

in February and April of 1976 by the

City, is not enough to reach the level of a "formal agreement"
which would have the effect of restricting management's traditional prerogative of determining what work is to be performed
on any particular shift and how many employees are needed at
any given time.
For the foregoing reasons I conclude that the Union's
case fails to satisfy the threshold requirement of proving a
"past practice" within the requisite meaning of Section 9 of
the contract.

For that reason the grievances are denied,
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without need to determine the various other contentions in
this case.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The grievances of Joseph E. Jones,
Norman E. Parnell, Jr. and Franklin
D. Bradley are denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 9, 1977
STATE OF: New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF: New York )
On this ninth day of March, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of the Arbitration
between
System Council International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

AWARD OF
ARBITRATORS
Case #1330 1090 76

and
Public Service Electric and Gas Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators under
the arbitration agreement between the above named parties,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties,
make the following AWARD:
The revision of the shift assignments at
the Kearney, Essex, Linden and Sewaren
generating stations do not presently
violate the collective bargaining agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

W. K. Huggler
Concurring

William D. Brown, Jr.
Dissenting
DATED: February 16, 1977
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York)
On this sixteenth day of February, 1977, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
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DATED: February
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1977
)
)

On this
day of February, 1977, before me
personally came and appeared W. K. Huggler to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

DATED: February
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1977
)s s *
) '

On this
day of February, 1977, before me
personally came and appeared William D. Brown, Jr. to me
known and known to me to be the individual described in
and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
System Council International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case #1330 1090 76

and
Public Service Electric and Gas Company

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement between the above named parties,
the Undersigned was designated as the Chairman of a tripartite
Board of Arbitration to hear and decide, together with the Union
and Company designees to said Board, the following stipulated
issue:
Whether the revision of the shift assignments
at the Kearney, Essex, Linden and Sewaren
generating stations violated the collective
bargaining agreements.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on December 9, 1976, at which time
representatives of the parties appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

Messrs. William B. Brown, Jr. and W.

K. Huggler served respectively as the Union and Company designees
to the Board of Arbitration.
waived.

The Oath of the Arbitrators was

The Board met in executive session on February 7, 1977.

The Union contends that the operational change from three
to four shifts at the four generating stations involved violated
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Article V Paragraph Q of the contract.

That section reads:

The Company will not increase the hours
of work beyond those now worked in order
to reduce the working force unless required to do so by governmental order.
It is undisputed that the change in operating procedure
from three shifts to four at the four generating stations
constituted an "increase in the hours of work."

(The additional

hours are scheduled on an overtime basis in accordance with the
overtime provisions of the contract.)

It is also undisputed

that the Company may schedule reasonable overtime, and there is
no contention herein by the Union that the quantity of overtime
involved as a result of the change in shifts was unreasonable.
What is in dispute is the Union's assertion that the change in
shifts was made by the Company "in order to reduce the working
force."

The Union argues that there can be no logical or

explainable reason for the change in the shifts except to put
the Company in a position where it will be able to perform the
same quantity of work with less employees.

And therefore, the

Union concludes the increase in hours worked resulting from the
shift schedule was for the obvious purpose expressly proscribed
by the foregoing contract

limitation.

The Company denies that the change in shifts was designed
for the purpose of reducing the working force.

It offered

various other reasons and explanations for effectuating the
shift changes.

However it asserts that in any event the shift

changes have not in any way reduced the working force within the
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meaning of a prior arbitration award dated January 31, 1961.
Citing that award, the Company points out that the instant
shift changes have not resulted in any layoffs or other reductions
in the working force; that the Company does not plan to layoff
any employees as a result of the shift changes, and that if it
is able to perform its work with fewer employees it will be
only the result of normal attrition.

In short the Company argues

that the acknowledged increase in hours worked resulting from
the shift changes did not reduce the working force; were not
effectuated in order to reduce the working force in the future;
and hence were not violative of Article V Paragraph Q of the
contract.
As I see it the issue is a very narrow one.

It turns on

what is meant by the phrase "in order to reduce the working
force."

In this regard I deem the previously mentioned

arbitration award to be material.

In the opinion of that Award,

Chairman Martin I. Rose defined that phrase to mean a reduction
in the existing working force.
with that interpretation.

I find no reason to disagree

He denied the Union's grievance in

that case, which also alleged a violation of Article V Paragraph
Q, because "there is no evidence that the schedule (E.S. "shift
changes") has resulted in layoffs or otherwise reduced the
existing working force."
In the instant case similarly, there is no evidence that
any employee suffered a layoff as a result of the shift changes

-4nor, within the language of the prior arbitration decision, is
there any evidence that the shift changes have "otherwise reduced the existing working force."

In other words the Union's

claim is at best premature, if not speculative.

It has not

shown any present reduction in the existing working force,
causally connected to the disputed shift changes.

It may be

that sometime later, employees will be put on a layoff, or the
presently existing working force otherwise reduced as a
proximate result of the instant shift changes.

In that event,

provided the causal connection is made, it would be my judgement
that the Union should then be able to grieve and carry the
grievance substantively to arbitration.

For that possibility

or eventuality, the Union's rights are expressly reserved.
However, at this juncture the Union has not shown that the
disputed shift changes were effectuated in order to reduce the
working force, simply because the Union has not been able to
produce evidence either of a reduction in the present working
force or any Company plan to do so.

Therefore it remains

prospective, and hence not part of this case, whether future
layoffs or other reductions in the working force, whatever those
reductions may be, are the result of the instant shift changes
and within the proscription of Article V Paragraph Q.
For the foregoing reasons and with the Union's rights
reserved as indicated, the Union's grievance is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between

'

System Council International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

'
'

and

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
and
AWARD
of
BOARD OF ARBITRATORS
Case #1330 1151 75

Public Service Electric and Gas Company1

In April of 1976 a majority of a Board of Arbitration
consisting of Eric J. Schmertz as Chairman and Messrs. Alfred W.
Giles and George Barnstorf, rendered an Award which inter alia
upheld the ten day disciplinary suspension of John Ogonowski, but
reversed his reclassification from Troubleman to Lineman/First
Class.

The Board ordered his restoration to the job of Troubleman,

and with the exception of his ten day suspension, directed that
he "be made whole for losses if- any."
The above named parties have reinstated the authority of
the Arbitrators and have requested that the instant Board of
Arbitration, consisting of Eric J. Schmertz as Chairman, Mr. Giles
as the Union designee, and Mr. C. W. Grevenitz, replacing Mr.
Barnstorf as the Company designee, clarify the aforementioned
Award by deciding the following stipulated issue:
During the period Ogonowski served as a
Lineman/First Class from July 18, 1974
to the date of implementation of the aforementioned Award, was he entitled to the
night shift differential and time and onehalf pay for the holidays he would have worked
and the overtime he would have worked had he
remained as a Troubleman.
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The instant Board of Arbitration met in Executive Session
on November 17, 1977.

Thereafter, in accordance with arrangement,

made at that meeting the Company submitted certain information
regarding overtime earned by Troublemen during the period of
July 1, 1973 to July 1, 1974 compared with the overtime earned
by Ogonowski during the same period, together with data regarding the amount of overtime pay hours worked by Ogonowski's
replacement in the Troubleman job during the period set forth in
the stipulated issue, and the rates of pay for those hours worked
It should be clear that the reversal of the Company's
reclassification of Ogonowski and the order that he be made whole
for losses if any, meant that he should receive or be compensated
for all the benefits he would have received had he remained as a
Troubleman and not improperly reclassified to Lineman/First

Class

There is noquestion that had he worked as a Troubleman during
the period set forth in the stipulated issue he would have
received a night shift differential in the total amount of
$357.52.

Therefore under the aforementioned Award he is entitled

to and the Company shall pay him that sum of money as the night
shift differential which he would have earned had he not been
removed from the Troubleman classification.
The record discloses that during the period in question
Ogonowski's replacement in the Troubleman job (Mr. J. Hilyard)
worked eight holidays and was paid at the time and one-half rate
for that work.

We are satisfied that had Ogonowski remained in
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the Troubleman job he would have worked those holidays and would
have received that pay.

Accordingly, under the aforementioned

Award, Ogonowski is entitled to and the Company shall pay him a
sum of money equivalent to time and one-half at the applicable
Troubleman rate for those eight holidays.
The matter of how much overtime if any he would have
worked had he remained in the Troubleman classification is more
difficult to calculate.

Based on the Chairman's request at the

meeting of the Board the Company submitted data designed to show
Ogonowski's pattern of accepting or rejecting overtime for the
approximate one year period preceding the period of time in
question.

Comparing the amount of overtime pay hours earned by

Ogonowski during the preceding one year period with the average
overtime pay hours earned by the other Troublemen during the same
period, we conclude that had Ogonowski remained as a Troubleman
he would have accepted and worked approximately eighty-two per
cent of the available or assigned overtime hours accepted and
worked during that period.

On that basis we find that Ogonowski

would have accepted and worked 186 overtime pay hours during the
period in question, which represents approximately eighty-two
per cent of the 277.7 overtime pay hours earned by Hilyard.

Again,

based on the foregoing Award, we conclude that Ogonowski is
entitled to be paid a sum of money equivalent to what he would
have earned from overtime he accepted and worked during the
period set forth in the stipulated issues as a Troubleman had he

-4not been reclassifled to Lineman/First Class.

Therefore the

Company is directed to pay him a sum of money equivalent to 186
overtime pay hours.

Inasmuch as two hourly rates of pay were

applicable to Hilyard's overtime pay period ($7.40 and $8.02),
and based on the ratio applicable to Hilyard's overtime pay,
111 of the foregoing 186 overtime pay hours shall be paid at the
rate of $7.40 an hour and the remaining 75 of the foregoing 186
overtime pay hours shall be paid at the rate of $8.02 an hour.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Alfred W. Giles
Concurring

C. W. Grevenitz
Dissenting
DATED: December 8, 1977
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
On this eighth day of December, 1977, before me personally
carne and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this
day of December, 1977 before me personally
came and appeared Alfred W. Giles to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this
day of December, 1977, before me personally came and appeared C. W. Greventiz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

Public Service Electricjpnd Gas Company ^BQ-fark Place Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/622-7000

R t -.

' '• -•u
November 23, 1977

Eric J. Schmertz, Esq.
122 East 42nd Street
New York, New York
10017
Dear Mr. Schmertz:
ARBITRATION CASE No. AAA 1330-1151-75
J. OGONOWSKI
The following information relating to J. Ogonowski's overtime
record is forwarded in accordance with your request:
Average overtime pay hours earned by Troublemen
(excluding Ogonowski) in Elizabeth Division during
the period of July 1, 1973 to July 1, 1974 459.82 hours
Overtime pay hours earned by Ogonowski during the
same period 380.3 hours

Troubleman hourly rate during period of Ogonowski's
assignment to Lineman July 18, 1974 to April 30, 1975
$7.40/hr.
May 1, 1975 to April 30, 1976
$8.02/hr.
J. Hilyard (Ogonowski's replacement) earned 227.7 overtime pay hours while Ogonowski was on regular duty.
Of these 227.7 hours, 134.2 were at the $7.40 rate and
93.5 hours were at the $8.02 rate.
I trust this information will be of help in determining what, if
any, back pay is due in the Ogonowski matter.
**

Very truly yours,

C. W. Grevenitz
Manager - Industrial Relations
Gas Operations
CC

Mr. A. W. Giles, Union-designated: Arbitrator

The Energy People
95-2001 (400M) 6-76

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
United Steel Workers of America,
Local 7274 AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #14 30 1378 76 Q

and
Quaker Alloy Casting Co.

In accordance with Section 12 of the collective bargaining
agreement dated April 11, 1973 between United Steel Workers of
America, Local 7274, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the
"Union" and Quaker Alloy Casting Co., hereinafter referred to
as the Company, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator
to hear and decide the following stipulated

issue:

What shall be the disposition of grievance
No. 8-76 dated February 20, 1976?
A hearing was held in Lebanon, Pennsylvania on May 12, 1977,
at which time representatives of the Union and Company appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived.
In pertinent part Grievance 8-76 reads:
The Company is in complete violation of
the Agreement by allowing a Myerstown
based sanitation service (to) empty the
dust collectors around the plant. This
work has been consistently performed by
the Yark Truck Drivers
Remedy sought: Allow Yark Truck Drivers
to again empty dust collectors.

-2Section 18.02 of the contract reads:
Work normally performed by employees in the
Bargaining Unit shall not be done by others,
either inside or outside the plant, when there
are employees within the plant available and
competent to do such work. The Company reserves
the right to contract such work to be done by
an outside source when the inauguration or continuation of such work in the plant becomes economically, or practicably not feasible, providing that
no Bargaining employee shall be deprived of his
normal work week as a result thereof. (Underscoring
supplied.)
Based on the record I am persuaded that the subcontracting
involved in the instant case falls within the foregoing underscored exception.
Under the State environmental

law the Company is required,

and was administratively notified, that removal of dust from its
plant dust collectors was to be done in a closed truck.
The Company did not own a truck meeting this statutory or
administrative requirement.

It is clear that if the Company

purchased such a truck it could be used for no other purpose
other than the removal of the dust and would be so utilized
only three times a week for a period of a few hours when the dust
collectors are emptied.

To require the Company to purchase a

truck of this type for such a limited purpose, would, in my
judgement, constitute the performance of such work by bargaining
unit Truck Drivers in a manner which would be "economically
or practicably not feasible" within the meaning of Section

18.02

of the contract.
That the Company concedes that it still removes some dust

-3from some other dust collectors in an open truck manned by
bargaining unit Truck Drivers, in apparent violation of the
State environmental law and administrative instructions, is
immaterial.

Obviously a failure to comply with the law in one

respect, cannot be used to support a claimed contract breach
when the Company acts to comply with the law in another and
comparable respect.

In short two wrongs would not make a right.

Finally it is further undisputed that no bargaining unit
truck driver,nor any other bargaining unit employee was laid off
as a consequence of this subcontracting nor "deprived of his
normal work week as a result thereof."

That some truck drivers

did not have as much overtime as a result, is not a reduction
in or a depreciation of the "normal work wee."

The "normal work

week" is defined in Section 5 of the contract, and neither under
this contract, or traditionally does it include overtime.
The Union also asserts a violation of that portion of
Section 18.03 of the contract which provides:
All other matters pertaining to outside contracting shall be discussed with the Grievance
Committee.
The Union's claim that the Company did not notify it or
discuss with it its plan to subcontract the emptying of some of
the dust collectors to a Myerstown sanitation service prior to
the initiation of the grievance, is unrefuted.

Ordinarily, in

the face of the mandatory language of the foregoing provision of
Section 18.03, I would be inclined to require the Company to

-4cease the subcontracting until that had been satisfied.

However

the Union candidly concedes that its allegation with regard to
that portion of Section 18.03 was not contemplated within the
original written grievance; was not referred to or argued during
the processing of the grievance; and was raised for the first
time at the arbitration hearing.

That being so I deem that in

this particular case the Union waived its rights to be notified
and to have the proposed subcontracting discussed with its
grievance committee.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
Grievance No. 8-76 dated February 20, 1976
is denied.

June 10, 1977

Eri-c J -

Schmertz
Arbitrator

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians Local 702, IATSE

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Radiant-Technicolor Laboratory
The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Employer has violated Article
16(e) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties in failing to pay
the proper wages to working foremen and
sub-foremen, and if so, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the Employer on
September 28, 1976 at which time representatives of the above
named Union and Employer appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath and the contract time

limit for rendition of the Award were waived.

The Employer and

Union filed post-hearing memoranda.
The pertinent part of Article 16(e) reads:
Working foremen and sub-foremen shall receive
no less than 10 percent above the highest base
rate in their respective departments
This case really involves deciding the meaning of "base
rate" in the foregoing Article.
addressed to that.

The Opinion and Award shall be

The Employer contends that the base rate is

the schedule of rates for each of the groups and job classifications set forth in Schedule A of the contract.

The Union asserts

-2-

that the "base rate" is the actual compensation received.
For all purposes I do not find the position of either
party to be correct.

The term "base rate" is common in industrial

relations and has a traditional meaning.

It means the hourly

rate which an employee receives or which attaches to his job
classification, exclusive of such additional compensable items
as premium pay, fringe benefits, shift differentials, and
incentive earnings.
I find nothing in this contract which endows the terminology "base rate" with any different or special interpretation.
I consider it irrelevant that employees receive overtime, holiday
pay, vacation pay, sick pay, severance and bereavement pay
calculated on their actual compensation rather than on the rates
of pay set forth in Schedule A.

For it should be noted, not only

that these are additional items of compensation for each eligible
employee and not a formula for differential between an employee
and his foreman or sub-foreman, but that the contract provides
for the payment of holiday and vacation pay at an employee's
regular rate, and expressly provides for the inclusion of shift
premium.

The parties must have meant that there be a difference

between regular pay and base rate, because they used two different
terms.

I am satisfied that the term regular pay means the actual

compensation an employee is receiving when he goes on vacation or
when a holiday falls, and the contract intends that during those
two periods of time he will be compensated as if he had been

-3working.

The same rationale and its irrelevance to Article 16(e)

applies to severance pay, bereavement and sick pay.
The Union asserts that the contract provides no definition
of "base rate."

However the foregoing differentiation between

the contract use of "regular pay" and "base rate" together with
Article 4(c) impels a conclusion closer to the Employer's
interpretation than that of the Union.

In pertinent part Article

4(c) provides:
employees, if any, receiving wages
over the prior base rate of their respective classifications shall continue to
receive the same amount over the base rate
set forth in Schedule A, so long as they
remain in said classifications. (Emphasis added.)
In the absence of any other contract definition the foregoing juxtaposition of "base rate" and Schedule A, provides,
inferentially at least, a logical argument that Schedule A and
"base rate" are synonymous.

I recognize that Article 4(c) could

represent the use of Schedule A as the base rate under the specific
circumstances mentioned therein, and not for all purposes including the application of Article 16(e).

Article 4(c) does

provide for wages less than the scales of Schedule A for new
and inexperienced

employees; the rates of Schedule A for new

and experienced employees; and for rates in excess of Schedule A
for those who had been receiving a higher rate.

Confined to

those circumstances I would be inclined to agree with the Union
that Article 4(c) may not necessarily be interpretative of the
term "base rate" as found in Article 16(e).

But frankly, I find

-4nothing else in the contract which supports the Union's unusual
view that base rate is synonymous with actual compensation, when
actual compensation includes premium pay, shift differentials,
merit increases and incentive earnings, and consequently I am
not persuaded that Article 4(c)

should be so confined.

Therefore, based on the traditional interpretation of "base
rate"; the coincidence of "base rate" with Schedule A as set
forth in Article 4(c);

and in the absence of any other explicit

definition of the term, I must conclude that "base rates" are
more often, and probably most often, the rates found in Schedule
A of the contract.

However it should be noted that Section 16(e)

refers to the "highest base rate in their respective departments",
not the "highest base rate of a classification in their respective departments."

To my mind this means that the "highest base

rate" referred to in Article 16(e)

is the base rate applicable

to and received by the highest paid employee supervised by a
foreman or sub-foreman in a particular department(s), not merely
the Schedule A rate attached to the classification of that
employee.

And therein lies the exceptions to the use of Schedule

A as the base rate for the application of Article 16(e).

For

example, an employee may have been hired at an hourly rate in
excess of the rate for that classification as set forth in
Schedule A.

In that event, that employee would receive a base

rate different from and higher than the Schedule A base rate.
And if his higher hourly rate was greater than others within the
department, that rate of pay would constitute the "highest base

-5rate in the respective department" within the meaning of Article
16(e), and the supervising foreman and/or sub-foreman would be
entitled to be paid at least 10 percent higher.

In other words

as between the Schedule A rate for a job classification and a
higher hourly rate paid an employee working within that classification, the base rate for purposes of Article 16(e) would be
the latter.
Similarly if an incumbent employee is transferred from one
job classification to another, and upon assuming the latter is
paid an hourly rate in excess of the Schedule A rate for that
job classification, his higher hourly rate would be his "base
rate."

And if that was the "highest base rate" in the department,

it would be the basis upon which the Article 16(e)

differential

for foremen and sub-foremen would be calculated.
There may be other instances in which an employee's hourly
rate, exclusive of premium pay, fringe benefits, incentive earnings and other special compensation might exceed the hourly rate
set forth in Schedule A.

The formula, as referred to in the above

examples, should be followed in those instances as well.
One specific question remains, and that is whether merit
increases serve to increase the hourly rate or base rate within
the meaning of the foregoing discussion.

The record is not clear

as to whether merit increases are red circled and separated from
an employee's hourly rate or base rate, or whether they are
merged into his hourly rate causing an increase in that rate and,
by consequence, the establishment of a new and higher hourly rate.
If the former is true a base rate would not include merit increases
If the latter is true, merit increases would have to be included

-6in the calculation of "the highest base rate."

That phase of

the issue I leave to the parties for application and implementation,
with their respective rights reserved to refer to me for specific
resolution disputes or questions arising therefrom.
One final point.

Though no evidence of the negotiation

history of Article 16(e) was introduced, I think it probable,
and agree with the Union, that the intent of Article 16(e) was
to provide compensation for foreman and sub-foreman in excess of
the pay received by those they supervise.

I would expect with

my ruling that the phrase "highest base rate" means the highest
actual hourly rate received by an employee whom a foreman or subforeman supervises , many of the possible instances in which
subordinate employees would receive more money than their foreman
or sub-foreman, would be corrected. On the other hand if subordinate employees are earning more because of overtime payments,
shift differentials and incentive earnings, and if this frustrates
an intent of Article 16(e), it can only be cured by negotiations
and not arbitration.
Accordingly the Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above named parties,
makes the following AWARD:
The phrase "highest base rate" in Article 16(e)
of the contract means the highest actual hourly
rate paid to an employee in the department or
departments supervised by a working foreman and/
or sub-foreman. In most instances that "base rate"
will correspond with the rates of pay set forth in
Schedule A of the contract. However where an

-7employee is hired at an hourly rate higher
than the Schedule A rate; transferred from
one classification to another and upon assuming the latter receives an hourly rate higher
than the Schedule A rate; or under other similar
circumstances with the same result, the "base
rate" shall be the higher rate. Because "base
rate" is limited to the "hourly rate", it does
not include incentive earnings, premium pay,
shift differentials or fringe benefits. Whether
merit increases are to be included in or excluded
from the calculation of base pay is remanded to
the parties for interpretation and implementation
consistent with the foregoing OPINION.
The parties are directed to apply the foregoing
AWARD to the circumstances presented in the instant grievance, and to make adjustments, if any,
in the pay of foreman and/or sub-foremen under
Article 16(e) of the contract retroactive to the
date of the grievance.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be shared by the parties
equally.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 24, 1977
STATE OF: New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF: New York )
On this twenty fourth day of May, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
UAW, Local 1251

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 30 0047 77

and
Republic Foil, Inc.

In accordance with Article VI of the collective bargaining agreement between Republic Foil, Inc. hereinafter referred
to as the "Company", and UAW Local 1251, hereinafter referred
to as the "Union", the Undersigned was designated as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Is the grievance arbitrable?
If so, did the Company violate the
contract with regard to the Award
of Robert F. Koretz in Case #12 30
0239 35 involving Albert Cahill, Jr.?
If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Danbury, Connecticut on June 15, 1977
at which time representatives of the Union and Company appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argumenl
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived.
The Union contends that the Company has failed to comply
with Professor Koretz's Award by refusing or failing to reemploy
Mr. Cahill after he was declared able to return to work by the
State Hospital in which he had been undergoing treatment.
I find the issue to be arbitrable because the dispute involves an allegation by the Union that the Company has failed to

-2comply with Section 3 of Article VI of the collective bargaining
agreement.

That section reads:
The decision of the Arbitrator shall be
final and binding upon the Company and
the Union and all employees concerned.

As the parties well know, arbitrability is not dependent
on the merits.

Rather, an issue is arbitrable if it is sounded

in an allegation of contract breach and if the grievance on its
face reasonably relates to the contract section allegedly
breached.

Here the Union's assertion that a prior arbitration

Award was not properly implemented reasonably relates to the
foregoing Section of Article VI which imposes on both the Company
and the Union an obligation to respect arbitration decisions as
final and binding, and hence to be mandatorily complied with
and implemented.

Accordingly the grievance is arbitrable.

On the merits however I do not find the Company's refusal
to reemploy Mr. Cahill to be either violative of Professor
Koretz's Award or contrary to the collective agreement.
The relevant part of Professor Koretz's Award reads:
"
the appropriate remedy for the Company's
contractual violation is to award that if in
the future Cahill is able to present certification from the appropriate governmental and/or
medical authority that he is physically and
mentally able able and qualified to resume his
former duties, the Company shall place him upon
a preferential list and thereafter offer him reinstatement to his former or other position, in
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement,
as such employment becomes available and before

-3other persons not presently employed are
hired for such work, without prejudice to
Cahill's Continuous Service acquired as of
June 12, 1975." (Underscoring supplied).
Thereafter in response to a joint request by the parties
for clarification of his Award, Professor Koretz wrote in
pertinent part:
"I agree with the Company that the grievant
should have been treated as being on layoff
in the period beginning June 12, 1975."
The grievant sought reemployment on October 26, 1976
following certification of his ability to return to work by the
State Hospital.

That was more than a year and four months after

he commenced his layoff status in accordance with Professor
Koretz's clarification.

Article XIII Section C(d) of the

contract provides for the loss of Plant Continuous Service by:
"absence due to layoff for a continuous period in excess of one
year for employees with less than three years of plant continuous service at the time of layoff

"

The grievant had less than three years of plant continuous
service.

Professor Koretz's Award, as referred to above, granted

him the right of ±einstatement after certification of his
physical and mental ability to return to work and for his
placement on a preferential list for reinstatement "in accordance with the provisions of the agreement."

In other words,

the reinstatement rights which Professor Koretz accorded Mr.
Cahill were, by the explicit terms of Professor Koretz's Award

-4restricted by "the provisions of the Agreement."

Under the

Agreement an employee in Cahill's status lost all seniority
rights and the rights to recall and reinstatement if his period
of layoff exceeded one year.

Therefore the Company had no

obligation to rehire or reinstate Cahill when he was certified
capable of working a year and four months: after he began his
period of layoff.

In short, what reinstatement rights Professor

Koretz accorded him were extinguished by operation of the
provisions of the Agreement on June 12, 1976, one year after
his layoff began.

Additionally, it was stipulated that those

"new hires" cited by the Union as having been employed by the
Company for work which the grievant had performed or could
perform, were hired not during the period of time that the
grievant had reinstatement rights but subsequent to June 12,
1976 when his reemployment rights ended.
For the foregoing reasons the Union's grievance on the
merits is denied.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
1.
2.

The grievance is arbitrable.
The Company did not violate the
contract with regard to the Award
of Robert F. Koretz in Case #12 30
0239 75 involving Albert Cahill, Jr.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: July 6, 1977
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York )
On this sixth day of July, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Communications Workers of America
OPINION AND AWARD
and
Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Company

In accordance with Article 11 of the collective bargaining
agreement dated July 18, 1974 between Communications Workers of
America, hereinafter referred to as the "Union", and Southern
Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, hereinafter referred to as
the "Company", the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Whether the suspension of Patricia Herskind
was with proper cause?
A hearing was held in Fort Lauderdale, Florida on May 5,
1977 at which time Ms. Herskind, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant", and representatives of the Union and Company appeared
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The grievant was suspended for five days "for having unauthorized telephone equipment in her residence."
It is undisputed that without having followed prescribed
procedures for authorization; without paying for it; and without
it becoming part of her "service", the grievant had possession
of and for a while at least used in her apartment a "bell chime"
belonging to the Company.

-2The Company discovered this through the application of
General Instructions Regulation 3a which reads:
Special test equipment is used periodically
to verify telephone equipment and facilities
being used by all subscribers, which include
our employees. When unauthorized facilities
are detected by these tests (or through other
means) any employee who is using or who furnished
such facilities would be considered in violation
of these instructions.
The Company charges the grievant with a violation of
General Instructions No. 3 which reads:
No employee should defraud the Company by
providing for himself or others, or accepting for his use any unauthorized telephone
service or facility.
The grievant's defense is that she was told by one of her
foremen to take a bell chime and to use it in her home to wake
her up in the morning.

She testified that she had chronic

difficulty in arising on time and was developing a tardiness
record with the Company; that her foreman upon learning of this
difficulty, told her to take and use the chime to rectify the
problem.

She stated she considered this to be an authoritative

instruction from her "boss."

The Union argues that her subse-

quent use of the bell chime in accordance with those instructions
was therefore proper and not violative of the Company's General
Instructions.
Though the foreman denies her assertion, I am inclined to
believe her explanation.

I do so because at all relevant times

-3she freely and readily admitted having the chime.

When asked

about it by the Company, and based on the Company's version of
the events, she immediately acknowledged possession, never tried
to hide it, did not equivocate about it, and when the investigator went with her to her home, she produced it for him without
hesitation.

Indeed, at the latter point the grievant had an

opportunity to hide the bell chime and frustrate the investigation.

When accompanied by the investigator to her home she first

went into her apartment alone in order to remove her dog so that
the investigator would not be menaced.

At that point she could

have removed the bell chime or hidden it where it would be undetected.

That she did not , together with her earlier openness

and candor regarding its possession, leads me to believe that
she did not think that she had the bell chime in her possession
improperly or under unauthorized or other irregular

circumstances'.

This lends credence to her story that her foreman suggested and
authorized its use.

That the foreman denied the assertion can

be explained by the fact that an admission on his part would have
meant a violation by him of the General Instructions, which
might well have led to his discipline.
Unfortunately however I cannot make the foregoing conclusion
the basis of my decision in this case.

The question before me

is whether the Company had proper cause to discipline the
grievant at the time discipline was imposed.

I must conclude

-4that the Company had reasonable and proper grounds to do so.
An important element in the grievant's explanation was missing
at the time that the discipline was imposed, and its absence
was the grievant's responsibility.

When the investigation first

took place and thereafter during the processing of her grievance
through the grievance procedure, the grievant steadfastly refused
to name the foreman whom she said permitted her to take and use
the bell chime.

She disclosed the foreman's name for the first

time at the instant arbitration hearing.

Consequently at the

time the incident arose and when discipline was imposed, the
Company did not know who the foreman was and his name remained
exclusively within the grievant's knowledge.

Therefore the

Company had only the grievant's unsubstantiated story, and
lacking identification of the foreman had no reasonable way of
investigating the truth of what the grievant said.

Under that

circumstance, I cannot find fault with the Company's determination that the grievant's possession and use of the bell chime
was unauthorized.
That I now believe that she did not intend to defraud the
Company, because I accept her testimony that she was permitted
to take and use the bell chime by her foreman, is therefore not
conclusive.

She should have disclosed the foreman's name

earlier so that all the facts would be available to the Company
One might argue that the result would be the same.

But that is
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speculation.

The grievance procedure is intended to permit the

parties to explore with each other all the relevant information
and to adjust disputes short of arbitration where possible.
For the grievant to refuse to disclose the name of the foreman
during the processes preliminary to arbitration frustrated that
possibility.

I am not prepared to say that the Company's

attitude would have been different had there been full disclosure,
but at least this Arbitrator

would then have been in a position

to hold not only that he presently believes the grievant but tha
the Company should have believed her as well when the incident
occurred.
For the foregoing reasons, though I do not now believe
that the grievant intended to "defraud the Company" within the
meaning of General Instruction No. 3, I am unable to conclude
that the Company unreasonably believed otherwise at the time that
it investigated the incident and imposed the discipline.

There-

fore I must conclude that the Company had just cause for imposin
the five day suspension.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
At the time that the Company imposed a
five day suspension on Patricia Herskind
it had proper cause to do so.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: July 6, 1977
STATE OF: New York )ss.
COUNTY OF: New York ) "
On this sixth day of July, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local 363

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330-1786-76

and
Spring Valley Water Company

The stipulated issue is:
In accordance with the collective bargaining
agreement does the Company have the Authority
to have maintenance and forestry work and
custodian work performed by independent contractors? If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on February 9, 1977 at the Company
offices, at which time representatives of the above named Union
and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
This is the classical subcontracting case where the
employer subcontracts

to an independent contractor work previ-

ously performed by bargaining unit personnel; where the collective bargaining agreement contains no explicit restriction or
limitation on subcontracting by the employer; but where the union
contends that the subcontracting constitutes and impermissible
"constriction" of the bargaining unit and the union's jurisdiction, and is violative of the recognition clause, enumerated
job classifications and other "job security" provisions of the
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collective agreement.
In the instant case, as the stipulated issue indicates, the
Company has subcontracted the work of cutting the grass at three
locations, Lake DeForest, the Company's main headquarters and at
North Main Street, and has subcontracted the custodial work at
the Lake DeForest plant and at Perry House.

As a consequence,

certain maintenance and forestry job classifications were deactivated, as was the affected custodian classification, but none
of the previous incumbents in those classifications were laid
off.

(The custodian was discharged for "absenteeism and poor

performance" and the affected maintenance and forestry employees
were assigned elsewhere.)

It is undisputed that the subcontractec

work was previously performed by bargaining unit employees in
those respective classifications; that the work has not been
discontinued, but rather "farmed out" to the independent
contractors.
To this classical subcontracting case there is a classical
arbitral answer to which the majority of arbitrators subscribe
and with which this arbitrator is in agreement.
the absence of an explicit contractual

It is that in

limitation or restriction

on subcontracting, the traditional recognition clause, a job
classification schedule and other typical contract provisions are
not sufficient to bar the employer from subcontracting work which
has been performed by bargaining unit personnel.

Rather, those

clauses are interpreted to mean that if the employer decides to

-3perform that work with his own employees, he must do so with
bargaining unit personnel in job descriptions which are part of
the union's jurisdiction.

But the threshold

question as to

whether certain work will be performed by his own employees or
subcontracted to an independent contractor remains a managerial
decision.
However, under the foregoing majority view arbitrators nevertheless impose certain conditions which an employer must meet
in order to have subcontracting decisions sustained.

In the

instant case I find that those conditions have been met by the
Company, or that there is no evidence or allegations of noncompliance.

The first is that the decision to subcontract must

be for bonafide economic reasons. I am satisfied that in the
instant case the Company's decision was primarily for that reason
Second, the subcontracting may not be so broad in scope as to
cause a substantial diminution in the size of the bargaining
unit thereby jeopardizing the continued integrity and viability
of the unit and the union's jurisdiction.

Here, there were no

layoffs attributable to the subcontracting and only three or
four bargaining unit employees were in any way affected.

I do

not consider that to be of such magnitude as to jeopardize the
integrity and effectiveness of the active bargaining unit that
remained or the rights of the Union as the legal representative
of that unit.

Third, the subcontracting must not have as its

intent or objective the undermining of the Union as the bargaining agent.

There is no such allegation in this case.

Finally,

-4the subcontractor to whom the work is given must pay wages and
accord other conditions of employment to its employees which are
not significantly inferior to the prevailing union conditions
for that type of work in the applicable industry and/or the
geographical area.

There is no evidence in the record that the

independent contractors involved in the instant subcontracting
do not meet these requisite standards.
In short, the customary conditions which arbitrators place
on employers in those cases where there is no explicit contractual
limitation or restraint on the employers right to subcontract,
have been met by the Company in this case, or the record shows
no violations or inconsistancies with those conditions.

Hence,

based on the well established majority view, I find no contractual violations by the Company's decision to subcontract the
subject work previously performed by employees in the maintenance
and forestry classification and in the custodian classification.
In my judgement the foregoing is buttressed by the additional fact that in the contract negotiations of 1974 and 1976
the Union demanded but failed to obtain an explicit contract
provision prohibiting "contract(ing) if it will result in loss
of employment to the employees covered by this agreement."

In

view of the undisputed fact that the Company has regularly and
historically employed independent contractors to perform various
other job assignments (but which were not removed from the bargain
ing unit or otherwise not contested by the Union), I must construe

-5the Union's demands in each of those years as an effort to
protect its members from any subsequent Company decision to
subcontract bargaining unit work.

And further, I must interpret

it as acknowledgement by the Union that absent any such clause,
the contract, including the recognitiion clause, the job
classification schedule and other existing provisions did not
and would not prohibit the Company from subcontracting.

Having

failed to obtain what it sought, I must conclude that the
Company's right to subcontract, limited only by the foregoing
enumerated conditions, remained otherwise unrestricted.
I do not consider Union exhibit #1, the letter of March
1973 from the then Union unit chairman to the then Company
personnel director as sufficiently evidentiary to overturn or
negate any of the foregoing conclusions.

The Union offered no

testimony to explain the circumstances of that letter, and the
Company representative testified that he had no recollection of
it whatsoever.

Though the letter refers to what appears to be

a mutual understanding between the Union and the Company with
regard to the use of an outside contractor to do some work
normally performed by the Company's landscape crew, I cannot
construe it as any general agreement between the Union and the
Company that outside contractors would be used only by mutual
agreement.

Standing alone, and absent further direct testimony

and explanation it refers and is limited to a particular incident
at that particular time, and under no rule of interpretation

-6can it be deemed as a waiver by the Company of its right to
subcontract bargaining unit work at other times.
In short, I find that what the Union is seeking in this
arbitration is what it sought to obtain but failed to obtain
in the 1974 and 1976 negotiations.

Hence, the kind of restric-

tions which the Union claims should attach to the subcontracting
of bargaining unit work remains a matter for collective bargaining
between the parties and not for arbitration.
Accordingly the Undersigned duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
In accordance with the collective bargaining
agreement the Company has the authority to
have the maintenance and forestry work and
the custodian work which are the subjects of
this arbitration performed by independent
contractors. The Union's grievance is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 8, 1977
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
On this eighth day of March, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 8-891 Oil, Chemical And
Atomic Workers International Union

AWARD
Grievance #327-18-76

and
Union Carbide Corporation, Chemicals
And Plastics Operations Division

The Undersigned Arbitrators having been designated in
accordance with the arbitration agreement entered into by the
above named parties and entered into dated May 5, 1976 and
having heard the proofs and allegations of the parties make
the following AWARD:

The Company violated the contract by
assigning Ralph Montrey to the position
of Janitor in Building #71 on March 3,
1976.
In accordance with his seniority
he shall be permitted to bump into a
Maintenance Mechanic job in Area 1.
Mr. Montrey is denied a retroactive
adjustment in his pay.

ErioTJ. Schmertz
Chairman

Vernon M. Jensen
Concurring in No. 1
above. Dissenting
from No. 2 above.

Vincent M. Liscio
Concurring in No. 2
above. Dissenting
from No. 1 above.
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DATED: February 10, 1977
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this tenth day of February, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 8-891 Oil, Chemical And
Atomic Workers International Union
OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Grievance #327-18-76

and
Union Carbide Corporation, Chemicals
And Plastics Operations Division

In accordance with Article X of the collective bargaining
agreement dated May 5, 1976 between Local 8-891 Oil, Chemical
And Atomic Workers International Union, hereinafter referred to
as the "Union", and Union Carbide Corporation, Chemicals And
Plastic Operations Division, hereinafter referred to as the
"Company", the Undersigned was selected as the Chairman of a
Tripartite Board of Arbitration to hear and decide, together
with the Union and Company designees to said Board, the following stipulated issue :
Did the Company violate the contract by
assigning Ralph Montrey to the position
of Janitor, Building #71, on March 3,
1976? If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company offices in Bound Brook,
New Jersey on November 22, 1976 at which time Mr. Montrey, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant", and representatives of
the Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

Messrs. Vernon Jensen and Vincent

M. Liscio served respectively as the Union and Company Arbitrators
on the Board of Arbitration.

The Board of Arbitration met in

Executive Session on January 26, 1977.

-2Put another way, the issue as I see it is whether, consider
ing the grievant's medical and physical disability, and the
restrictions on where he is able to work to avoid aggravating
that condition as set forth in the prior Arbitration Award of
July 28, 1971, was he improperly denied the right to exercise
his seniority to laterally bump into a Maintenance Mechanics
job in some other area of the Company after Building #105, in
which he was working, was closed?
The Company's position is that in view of the grievant's
pulmonary disability, there were no areas other than Building
#71 which would not subject him to fumes, chemicals and dirt,
proscribed by his disability, and that only janitorial work was
available in Building #71.
It is undisputed that but for the grievant's physical
disability, his seniority is sufficient to permit him to bump
other Maintenance Mechanics in various other areas of the
Company's operation.
The Company argues that because the grievant has persistently refused to supply an updated medical evaluation of his
present condition it had the right to bar him from any area of
the plant in which, in the Company's judgement, he would be
exposed to conditions incompatible with his pulmonary disability,
and which might subject the Company to additional Workmen's
Compensation liability.
As I see it the answer to the instant dispute is found in
my Opinion which accompanied the July 28, 1971 Arbitration Award.

-3In that Opinion, and at that time, it was stipulated that
Building #105 was the "second 'cleanest1 building of the
Company's installation."

It is uncontested that Area 1 was

the cleanest Company installation.

Based on the record before

me, together with the visual inspection which was part of this
hearing, Area 1 is still the cleanest section of the Company's
operation.

In other words, in terms of exposure to chemicals,

fumes, dirt, dust and other irritants, Building #105 was not
the only section in which the grievant could work; Area 1 was
and is suitable as well.
In my prior Opinion I stated that the Workmen's Compensation decision, establishing the grievant's pulmonary disability
at 45 per cent, "disqualified (him) from again working in
Building #41 or in any other building with a comparable level
of fumes, gases, dust and dirt."
In that Opinion and Award it was held that Building

#105

was sufficiently free of the level of fumes, gas, dust and
dirt which characterized Building #41, and that the Workmen's
Compensation decision did not per se disqualify the grievant
from working in Building

#105.

Therefore, in the instant case the question narrows simply
to whether, with the closing of Building #105 there are any
other areas in which Maintenance Mechanics are employed which
are as "clean" as or "cleaner" than Building #105.

Obviously

based on the foregoing stipulated and undisputed condition of
Area 1, that area meets that test now, as it met the test in

-4July of 1971.

Accordingly, assuming that the grievant's

pulmonary condition has not improved, and pursuant to the
limitations the Board of Arbitration imposed in the July 28,
1971 Award, the grievant was then and still is medically capable
of working in Area 1 as a Maintenance Mechanic.

The Award

shall direct his transfer to that classification in Area 1.
However there are adequate reasons to deny the grievant
any retroactive adjustment in his pay.

First, I find unreason

able and unjusitifed his refusal to provide the Company with
an updated medical evaluation of his pulmonary condition.

Had

he done so, as the Company requested, he might have been
transferred to Area 1 with the closing of Building

#105.

Moreover, sometime earlier the Company attempted to transfer
the grievant from Building #105 to Area 1 and the grievant
vigorously, albeit erroneously, objected, claiming that such a
transfer violated the July 28, 1971 Award.

As a result of his

protest the Company returned him to Building 105.
the grievant cannot have it both ways.

Manifestly

He cannot resist trans

fer to Area 1 as he did previously, and now claim the right to
bump into Area 1 with a retroactive adjustment in his pay from
the Janitor classification to that of

Maintenance Mechanic.

For again, had he not protested the earlier transfer, he
probably would have been working in Area 1 without any loss
in pay or rank.

So the circumstances he protests in this

arbitration were, in significant part, his own fault.

For

that reason the Award will deny any retroactive adjustment in

-5his pay.
Finally, the grievant should clearly understand that to
uphold his right to a Maintenance Mechanic job in Area 1
carries with it the responsibility to fully perform all the
duties of that classification in that area.

He has no reason

to object to the performance of any of the required duties of
that classification because of his pulmonary condition or
related physical disability.

He claims that he is fully

capable of working in Area 1 without restriction; and therefore with this Award he must assume that responsibility.

He

should understand that if he is unable to perform all of the
proper duties required of him he would not be contractually
entitled to transfer to any other Company installation nor
would he have contractual right to exercise his seniority to
bump elsewhere.

In the judgement of this Arbitrator, under

that circumstance, the Company would have just cause to
terminate him from its employ.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Glass Bottle Blowers Association
of The United States and Canada,
Local 126, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Wheaton Industries

In accordance with Article 26 of the collective bargaining agreement effective August 30, 1976 between Glass Bottle
Blowers Association of The United States and Canada Local 126,
AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union" and Wheaton
Industries, hereinafter referred to as the "Company" the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear and decide disputes
relating to Union grievances 126-76-P-46, 126-76-P-49, 126-76-P51, 126-76-P-52, 126-76-P-53, and 126-76-P-63.
A hearing was held in Millville, New Jersey on July 14,
1977 at which time representatives of the Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

Having duly heard the proofs and

allegations, I render the following Opinions and Awards.
Grievance

126-76-P-46

The Union complains that the Maintenance Department unloaded machinery from a trailer when that work should have been
done by employees of the Warehouse and Shipping Department.
There is no dispute that by practice, certain departmental
jurisdiction over work assignments has been respected. Generally
the Warehouse and Shipping Department personnel unload trailers

-2that come into the warehouse.

However if the material to be un-

loaded requires certain expertise beyond that of the Warehouse
and Shipping Department, employees with those skills from other
departments are used for the unloading.

Here the Company claims

that the machinery on the trailer required the special attention
of the maintenance employees because the crates were "messed up"
and the type of machinery involved required special care and
rigging.
The evidence does not support the Company's contention
that this cargo was of such a special nature as to require the
specialized service of the Maintenance Department to unload it.
The testimony indicates that it was unloaded in a normal, ordinary way by use of a fork lift and wooden skids.

Additionally,

and signficantly, it is unrefuted that after the Maintenance
Department unloaded the machinery and simply placed it on the
factory floor, employees of the Warehouse and Shipping Department
moved the very same machinery, in the same manner, to a different
location.

There is no evidence that the Maintenance Department

performed any special maintenance work, assembly or other function
for which the Maintenance employees were uniquely qualified, in
unloading this particular cargo.

In short, I find that the

Maintenance Department did nothing different from what the
Warehouse and Shipping personnel did subsequently.

Accordingly

the Company has not established the special circumstances necessary

-3to justify an exception to the established practice of respecting
departmental jurisdiction in such situations.

The Union's written

grievance did not seek monetary damages, though the Union asked
for compensation

to employees of the Warehouse and Shipping

Department at the arbitration hearing.

The Arbitrator is bound

by the grievance as it was processed through the steps of the
grievance procedure prior to arbitration.

Accordingly the Union's

request for a monetary award must be denied.

As the grievance re-

quests the Company is directed in the future to assign work of
this type, under these conditions, to the Warehouse and Shipping
Department.
Grievance 126-76-P-49
The Union contends that there has been a long standing
differentiation between "shift electricians" and "construction
electricians."
electricians

It asserts that construction work by construction

is to be performed only on the day shift.

The

Union's grievance is that a shift electrician on the four PM to
midnight shift was assigned "construction work" of running conduit for new wiring.
The Union claims that in the 1976 contract negotiations
the Company assured it that all "construction work" would be
"done as day work"; and that based on that assurance the Union
agreed to permit flexibility of work assignments between the
"shift electricians" and Hydraulic Mechanics.

Or in other words,

because of that assurance, the Union felt that electrician jobs

-4would be sufficiently secure as to allow Hydraulic Mechanics and
shift electricians to perform certain of the same duties on an
interchangeable basis.

The Union's concern, in this grievance is

that if construction work can be assigned to shift electricians,
and shift electricians work performed by Hydraulic Mechanics,
the Company can reduce the number of electricians needed, particularly shift electricians.
The Company denies giving the Union any assurance that
construction work would be confined to the day shift and to
"construction electricians."

It points out that the contract does

not contain the classifications "construction electrician" and
"shift electrician", but rather specifies electricians as either
"master electricians" or "maintenance electricians." It argues
that under the management rights clause (Article 24) it may, under
its power to "direct the working forces", determine what electrical
work will be performed; the shifts on which the work is to be
done; and which qualified electricians shall do it.
The evidence on the oral assurance upon which the Union
relies is contradictory and hence offsetting.
stance it has not been proved.

Under that circum-

Moreover, considering the disputed

testimony, I cannot conclude that that the Company's explicit
contract right under Article 24 to "direct the working forces" was
either changed or limited as alleged by the Union.

Also, in the

absence of classifications of "shift electricians" and "construction electricians" I cannot conclude that there are two separate

-5electrician classifications so-labelled, nor am I able to find
that there is any binding differentiation of work between them or
that construction work must at all times be assigned to a day
shift electrician.

The job descriptions of the two electrician

classifications referred to in the contract, namely "maintenance
electrician" and "master electrician" contain no language, conditions or specifications which would mandate the assignment of socalled "construction work" only to a day shift electrician.
Accordingly, though I understand the Union's concern that
an extensive application of the assignment of electrical construction work to a shift electrician on shifts other than the day
shift might erode the job security of electricians, that has not
yet occurred.

As presently speculative, it is not presently a

basis upon which the Union's grievance can be sustained.
Accordingly the Union's grievance 126-76-P-49 is denied.
Grievance 126-76-P-51
The parties have stipulated that prior to the 1976 contract negotiations layoffs were effectuated by classification and
recalls were to classifications within departments, despite the
fact that the contract provided for the application of departmental seniority in such situations.

In short it is expressly

conceded that the practice which the parties followed in relevant
layoff and recall situations differed from the contract.
The Union's grievance is that subsequent to the 1976 contract negotiations and under the current agreement the Company has

-6implamented layoffs and recalls in strict compliance with the
explicit seniority provisions of Article 4 of the contract rather
than following acknowledged past practice.
It is well settled that where a past practice varies from
the clear and unambiguous

contract langugage, either side may

require a return to the contract language upon notice to the other.
However that well settled rule applies only where the past
practice has not, either

by conduct or agreement of the parties

become a modification of the contract or a replacement for the
contrary written contract language.

Here, I find that the practice

which the parties followed in effectuating layoffs and recalls
by classification rather than by department, became a contract
change which replaced the relevant contrary provisions of Article
4.

The Company did not serve notice on the Union that it was

returning to the explicit contract langugage, thereby vitiating
the different past practice.

Instead, at the 1976 contract nego-

tiations it sought to make contract changes in the application of
seniority by proposing a "plant-wide" seniority plan.

Thereafter,

when the Company withdrew that proposal, it did not advise the
Union that henceforth

the contract language of Article 4 would

obtain, but rather, determinatively, (and without refutation herein) informed the Union that the application of seniority in layoff situations would "continue as before" pursuant to the mutually
agreed upon practice.

By doing that,

the Company negotiated

with the Union the continuance of the past practice.

And as a

-7consequence, bilaterally substituted that past practice for those
related departmental seniority provisions of Article 4 in layoff
and recall situations.

Though the Company had the opportunity to

unilaterally terminate the past practice and return to the contract
language of Article 4, it did not do so.

Instead it negotiated

the past practice as a term and condition of employment, ripening
that practice into a bi-laterally agreed to contract term, ableit
unwritten, as a replacement for those relevant parts of Article
4.
Accordingly the Union's grievance 126-76-P-51 is granted,
and the Company is directed to follow the practice as the
applicable and enforceable contract term.
Grievance 126-76-P-53
The parties have stipulated that the facts and their
respective contentions under Grievance P-51 are applicable to
this grievance as well.

The Union claims that had the past

practice referred to in the foregoing grievance been followed,
the grievant in Grievance P-53, John Davenport, would not have
been required to accept a Utility job in the Maintenance Department when he was working on a higher rated job as a Mixer in the
Material Service Department.
Davenport was laid off from the job of Hydraulic Mechanic
in the Maintenance Department.

He exercised "dormant" seniority

and bumped into the Mixer classification in the Material Service
Department.

Under the Departmental seniority provisions of

Article 4 Paragraph 20, Section 3, Davenport was recalled to the

-8department from which he was laid off (i.e. the Maintenance
Department) to the lower paid job of Utility Man in accordance
with the contract provision which reads:
If an employee working in another department fails to accept recall to his department within five (5) calendar days he is
not eligible for future recall to that department unless he is prevented from working by
reason of sickness or injury.
In other words, in order to protect his recall rights to
a later vacancy as a Hydraulic Mechanic in the Maintenance Depart
ment he was required to accept recall to a Utility Man position
within the same Department, under the Departmental Seniority
provisions of Article 4.
The Union relies on past practice referred to in Grievanc
P-52.

It asserts that under that practice layoffs and recalls

are by classification and not simply by and to departments.

And

under that practice Davenport would not have been required to
return to any vacant position within the Maintenance

Department

but rather could have awaited a vacancy in the Hydraulic Mechanic
job before being required to accept recall.

Having held that

the Company and the Union bilaterally negotiated the practice
as a substitute for and a change in those provision of Article
4 which provide for the use of departmental seniority in the
relevant cases of layoffs and recalls, I must conclude that the
foregoing contract section under which the Company required
Davenport to accept a Utility Man job, was voided and inoperative

-9Accordingly the Company did not have the right, subsequent to
the 1976 negoitations, to require Davenport to give up his job
as a Mixer in the Material Service Department and assume the
lower paying job of Utility Man in the Maintenance Department.
The remedy which the Union seeks is granted.

Davenport is to

restored to the job of Mixer until a Hydraulic Mechanic position
becomes available to which his eniority would entitle him, and
he shall be made whole for wages lost by his transfer from the
Mixer job to the Utility Man position.
Grievance

126-76-P-63

This grievance is decided on the same basis and for the
same reasons as the foregoing decision in Grievance 126-76-P-53.
Again the Company effectuated a recall based on the
written contract language of Article 4 and particularly
sentence of Paragraph 20 Section 3 thereof.

the last

However, as prev-

iously indicated, I have ruled that the parties bilaterally
substituted the aforementioned past practice for the departmental
seniority provisions of Article 4 in relevant layoff and recall
cases, and that that past practice became the bilaterally
accepted condition of employment in those situations.

On that

basis the grievant, Walter Bell, should not have been required
to accept a recall as a Utility Man in order to protect his recall rights to the job of Mold Maker in the Mold Shop.

However,

as it appears that he was upgraded from the Utility Man position
to Mold Maker as soon as a vacancy in the latter job occurred,

-10I do not find that he was monetarily damaged.

Accordingly

though the Union's grievance is sustained on the application
of the contract, it's request for "lost wages" is denied.
Grievance 126-76-P-52
The grievant, Bob Shea claims that subsequent to the
strike other employees with less seniority were recalled to or
were working in the Warehouse and Shipping Department in which
he had recall seniority, while he remained on layoff.
The Company contends that the grievant failed to inform
it os his seniority rights for recall to the Warehouse and
Shipping Department (inasmuch as he worked in the Mold Shop at
the time of the strike, and was laid off from that Department
when the strike ended) and that when it learned of those
seniority rights it promptly recalled him to work in the
Warehouse and Shipping Department on September 13, 1976.
The Union counters that the Company expressly asked
the Union not to have its members call the Company seeking
assignments but rather to await calls from the Company based
on how and at what pace the Company decided to resume its
operation.

Hence, the Union argues that the grievant was

foreclosed by that request from asserting or indicating his
dormant seniority for recall purposes to the Warehouse and
Shipping Department, and that he should not now be penalized
by a period of layoff from August 30 to September 13, 1976.

-11As I see it the Company erred in two interrelated ways.
First, if it was to layoff all or part of the work force at the
end of the strike, those layoffs should have been in accordance
with appropriate seniority.

Here it appears that though the

grievant was laid off commencing August 30, 1976 when the strike
ended, other employees with less seniority went to work that
very day.
off at all.

Those latter employees, as I see it, were not laid
In that respect, by laying off some employees and

not others with less seniority, the Company did not properly
comply with the layoff procedures.

And secondly, having asked

the employees to await assignments from the Company, the Company
must then accept the responsibility of ascertaining which jobs
and into which departments employees had a right of recall.
That responsibility required the Company to determine which
employees had greater seniority for recall to jobs in the
Shipping Department.

The fact is that the grievant had greater

seniority for that purpose than other employees who were put to
work in that department on August 30th.
Accordingly the grievance is granted and the Company
is directed to make Mr. Shea whole for wages he lost from August
30th to September 13th, 1976, at the rate of pay he would have
earned had he been assigned to the Shipping Department on August
30th.

DATE: August 15, 1977
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
.

On this fifteenth day of August, 1977, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

